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There is cause for concern any time the federal civil rulemakers-the Supreme
Court, the Judicial Conference and its committees-overstep the limits ofrulemaking
authority delegated to the Court under the Rules Enabling Act (the "REA" or "Act").
Although certainly not for the first time,' such a transgression occurred with the
t Copyright 2000 by Leslie M. Kelleher.
* Associate Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. Many thanks to Ed
Brewer, Hamilton Bryson, and J.P. Jones for their helpful comments. This Article is dedicated
to the memory of Christopher Hassan-Baker, UR Law, 1996.
1. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The ConstitutionalLimits of
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promulgation of Rule 4(k) in 1993. But in the unprecedented controversy over other
amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,particularly the amendments
to Rule 11 and to the discovery provisions,2 the metamorphosis of Rule 4 almost
escaped notice.
Before the 1993 amendments, Rule 4 governed only the methods, and territorial
reach, of service of process, a matter of procedure within the scope of the Court's
authority under the Rules Enabling Act.3 As amended, Rule 4 governs not only
service, but now Rule 4(k) also explicitly purports to govern amenability to
jurisdiction. In doing so, the amended Rule 4(k) impermissibly affects a "substantive
right" within the meaning of the Rules Enabling Act. It therefore is beyond the scope
of rulemaking authority allocated to the Court by that Act, and is invalid.
I. INTRODUCTION

The current process of civil procedure rulemaking for the federal courts is under
attack. 4 Congress ceded the task to the Supreme Court in 1934 during the New Deal,'
reflecting the faith that Congress and the public placed in the judiciary's expertise in
matters of procedure.6 The Court created a Rules Advisory Committee, which

JudicialRulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal
Rule 23, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 461, 482-93 (1997) (arguing that Rule 68, promulgated as part of
the original rules in 1938, was invalid as violative of the "substantive right" limitation in the
Rules Enabling Act, and that the Court subsequently interpreted the rule in a manner that was
an even greater transgression of the limitations of the REA). Other problematic rules include
Rule 15(c) (concerning relation back of amended pleadings and impermissibly affecting
limitations periods) and Rule 35 (permitting court-ordered physical examinations). See
generally, on the scope and the Court's treatment of the "substantive right" limitation in the
REA, Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (In the Rules EnablingAct) More
Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47 (1998).
2. See Laurens Walker, A ComprehensiveReform forFederalCivil Rulemaking,61 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 455,455-56 (1993). For a discussion of the 1993 amendments to the rules, see
Leslie M. Kelleher, The December 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-A CriticalAnalysis,12 TOURO L. REV. 7 (1995).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).
4. See Paul D. Carrington, The New Orderin JudicialRulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161
(1991); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991); Walker, supra note 2.
5. See Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994)).
6. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of
CivilProcedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909,944-48 (1987) (noting that
the rules reflected New Deal principles, including greater discretion by the judiciary, which
had expertise in the area); Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the FederalRules
of Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1269-75 (1997) (arguing that the delegation of
responsibility for rulemaking to the Supreme Court reflected the New Deal commitment to
expertise); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurabilityin ConstitutionalLaw,
78 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1462 n.96 (1990) (arguing that the Federal Rules were part of the New
Deal); cf Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence and Emerging ProceduralPatterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2005-06 (1989)
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included experts from academia and practice.7 Today, the Rules Advisory Committee,
along with the Judicial Conference created by Congress in 1958,8 has the primary
responsibility for proposing amendments to the rules.9
Rules promulgated under the REA are to govern only "practice and procedure,"
and are not to "abridge, modify or enlarge any substantive right."' ° For decades,
Congress was content to rely on the Court to comply with that limitation, satisfied
with the Court's assurance that it would do so." But since the end of the New Deal,
Congress increasingly has regulated procedure and the rulemaking process. 2 The
imbroglio over the Rules of Evidence in 1973 was just the beginning. " From that
time, Congress continued to insinuate itself into the rulemaking process, by
disapproving, delaying, and rewriting proposed amendments to the rules, propelled

[hereinafter Subrin, FederalRules] (pointing out that when the REA was enacted in 1934,
many members of Congress and the public distrusted the conservative Supreme Court, which
was perceived as antagonistic to progressive New Deal social legislation, and for that reason
the Court's discretion in the promulgation of procedural rules was somewhat circumscribed,
including a requirement that such rules be trans-substantive, and thus less easily manipulated
to favor particular interests).
7. See Order of June 3, 1935, 295 U.S. 774 (1934).
8. See Act ofJuly 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331
(1994)). In 1956, the Supreme Court had discharged its Rules Advisory Committee, see Order
Discharging the Advisory Committee, 352 U.S. 803 (1956), and the Judicial Conference was
established by Congress to assume the role the Advisory Committee had played. The Judicial
Conference created its own Rules Advisory Committee. See 1958 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
REPORT 6-7 (1958); see also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1006-1007 (2d ed. 1987).
9. For a description of the rulemaking process by a former Reporter for the Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules, see Paul D. Carrington, MakingRules To Dispose ofManifestly
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil

Procedure,137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067 app. at 2119-24 (1989); see also Karen Nelson Moore,
The Supreme Court'sRole in Interpretingthe FederalRules of Civil Procedure,44 HASTINGS

L.J. 1039 (1993).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b) (1994).
11. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1001.
12. See Walker, supra note 6; see also Charles Gardner Geyh, ParadiseLost, Paradigm
Found:Redefining the Judiciary'sImperiledRolein Congress,71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1167

(1996) (arguing that in the wake of Watergate and other scandals, public cynicism about
government reached new highs and contributed to the imperiled role of the judiciary in
procedural rulemaking).
13. The amendments to the Rules of Evidence proposed in 1973 included rules defining
testimonial privileges. Concerned that the proposed rules were too substantive to be
promulgated by the Court, and may have violated federalism limits by affecting privileges in
diversity cases, Congress delayed the effectiveness of the amendments and later rewrote and
enacted the Evidence Rules by legislation. See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87
Stat. 9. "The title of the Act, an 'Act to promote the separation of constitutional powers,"'
indicates Congress's concern that the Court had overstepped not just statutory, but also
constitutional, rulemaking authority. Kelleher, supra note 1, at 83 n.155. For a discussion of
the events surrounding the 1973 mendments to the Rules of Evidence, see Paul D. Carrington,
Learningfrom the Rule 26 Brohaha: Our CourtsNeed Real Friends,156 F.R.D. 295, 299-

301 (1994); John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth ofErie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693 (1974).
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in large part by the lobbying efforts of various interest groups. 14 Congress also
increased its oversight of, and public participation in, the rulemaking process, With
the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act,'" and with the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990,16 which required district courts to adopt local plans to reduce expense
and delay in the judicial process. Indeed, the Civil Justice Reform Act was enacted
over the Judicial Conference's objection that the matter should be dealt with by the
rulemaking process established in the REA.' On occasion, lobbyists have convinced
Congress to bypass the rulemaking process entirely, and provide special procedures
for specific classes of cases by legislation, in order to favor certain interest groups.
An obvious, and egregious, example is the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 ("PSLRA"),"8 enacted in response to intense lobbying efforts by accounting,
securities, and high-tech firms, which perceived themselves as victimized by abusive
securities lawsuits. Rather than alter the substantive standards for such suits, Congress
in the PSLRA provided procedural rules favorable to defendants, "to tilt the balance
in securities litigation in favor of the defendant at virtually every juncture."' 9

14. See Carrington, supranote 13, at 300; Moore, supra note 9, at 1053-61. The lobbying
efforts against the introduction of Rule 26(a), requiring automatic disclosure, are another recent
example. When efforts to persuade the Judicial Conference and Court to abandon the efforts
were unsuccessful, opponents of the provision turned to Congress. A bill to eliminate the
provisions was passed by the House, and, it seemed, would have been passed by the Senate,
but had to go through the Senate Judiciary Committee first. As that Committee required
unanimity, Senator Metzanbaum's objections to the House Bill were sufficient to prevent it
reaching the Senate floor before adjournment ofthe session, and the provision became law. See
Carrington & Apanovitch, supranote 1, at 484-85.
Ultimately, changes to the unpopular provision were left to the REA process. The Judicial
Conference recently approved rules amendments that will limit the scope of automatic
disclosure, and will send them to the Supreme Court with the recommendation that they be
transmitted to Congress. A prior version of the proposed amendments is reprinted in
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 181
F.R.D. 18 (1998). The Judicial Conference approved a slightly revised version, other than the
proposed amendments to Rule 26(b)(2), dealing with cost bearing. The Court approved the
amendments and forwarded them to Congress on April 17,2000. See H.R. Doc. No. 106-228
(2000), available in (visited May 31, 2000) <httpllwww.uscourts.govrulesapproved.htm>.
The amendments will become effective December 1, 2000, unless Congress decides to delay
or change them by legislation.
On another front, Congress again entered the rulemaking arena by amending the Rules of
Evidence to limit the admissibility of evidence regarding the history of victims of sexual
assault. See Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 §
320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (amending Federal Rules of Evidence by adding Rules
413-415).

15.28 U.S.C. §§ 2073-2074 (1994) (providing increased congressional oversight of rules
amendment process and greater public access to Rules Committee deliberations).
16.28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
17. See Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the FederalCourts, 45
929, 952-66 (1996); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformationin Procedural
Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992).
DUKE L.J.

18. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
19. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future ofthe PrivateSecurities LitigationReform Act: Or,
Why the Fat Lady HasNot Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 995 (1996).
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It may be that the demise of the current judiciary-dominated rulemaking process
cannot be halted. Perhaps the increasing politicization of procedural rulemaking is
inexorable and irreversible-that, as Professor Mullenix has warned, the judicial
rulemakers are doomed to "go the way of the French aristocracy."2 More
optimistically, perhaps the rulemaking process can be overhauled, and thejudiciary's
valuable role salvaged.2' Given their tenuous hold on the rulemaking process, the
judicial rulemakers-the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference and its
committees-should do what they can to preserve their position. The most immediate
action the Court and the rulemakers can take is to respect the "substantive right"
limitation of the Rules Enabling Act.
Although in the past the Court often has failed to pay sufficient attention to the
"substantive right" limitation of the Rules Enabling Act, the Court has, in recent
years, begun to take that limitation more seriously.' The Judicial Conference and its
Advisory Committees also appear to have been more attentive to the limits on the
rulemaking authority. For example, in 1996, an amendment to Rule 23 was proposed
that would have authorized for settlement purposes only the certification of class
actions not otherwise qualified for purposes of trial under the rule.' The Judicial
Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure received a
large number of public comments opposing the amendments on the ground, among
others, that such a rule would violate the limitations of the Rules Enabling Act as well
as the constitutional separation of powers.24 The proposed amendment was dropped.
And when commentators raised similar objections to proposed amendments to Rule
4 concerning service in foreign countries, the Supreme Court sent the proposal back
to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee for further study, and the offending
provisions were revised in light of those concerns."
The rulemakers, however, have not been consistently vigilant. Professors Burbank
and Carrington, the latter of whom was at the time the Reporter for the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee, raised concerns about the validity of Rule 4(k) when an earlier
version of the amendment first was proposed.26 The proposal was amended, although
not in such a way as to totally alleviate those concerns.27 The Committee (or Professor
Carrington, at least) wanted Congress to enact legislation providing for nationwide
28
service of process in federal question cases, rather than having it dealt with by rule.

20. Mullenix, supra note 4, at 802.
21. There is a vigorous debate on how best to reform the current rulemaking system. See,
e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance andProceduralLaw Reform: A Callfora Moratorium,
59 BROOK. L. REv. 841 (1993); Geyh, supranote 12, at 1233-41; Walker, supra note 2.
22. See Kelleher, supranote 1.
23. See Proposed Amendment to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b).
24. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997) (citing, for example,
Letter from Steering Committee to Oppose Proposed Rule 23, signed by 129 law professors
(May 28, 1996), and Letter from Paul D. Carrington (May 21, 1996)); see also Carrington &
Apanovitch, supranote 1, at 462-74.
25. See infratext accompanying note 144.
26. See infra Part III.D.
27. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Worldin OurCourts, 89 MICH. L.REv. 1456, 1484 n.164
(1991).
28. See Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 1, at 486.
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Instead, on the recommendation of a legislative staffer, the Committee settled for the
unusual move of calling to Congress's attention the dubious authority with which it
proposed the amendment to the rule.29 Congress did nothing, and the amendment
became law. Despite Congress's apparent lack of concern, the rulemakers and the
Court should pay closer attention when two of the leading authorities on the Rules
Enabling Act question the validity of a proposed rule. And, as this Article
demonstrates, Rule 4(k) indeed is invalid, although not for the precise reasons
previously suggested. The Court and the rulemakers should remedy the problem by
proposing a repeal of 4(k) before it is challenged in an appropriate case,3" and by
recommending to Congress that a standard of nationwide amenability to jurisdiction
for federal questions be provided by legislation. The Court that struck down the Line
Item Veto Act's allocation of authority to deal with the budget deficit-to which
Congress and the President had agreed3 '-surely cannot ignore an important
limitation on its own delegated rulemaking power, particularly one based on
separation of powers concerns.
After a brief examination in Part II of the allocation of rulemaking authority to the
Supreme Court in the Rules Enabling Act, and the meaning of the Act's proscription
against rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,"32 Part III ofthis
Article reviews the history and promulgation of the 1993 amended Rule 4(k). In a
related article, a test for assessing the validity of rules under the Rules Enabling Act
was proposed.33 In Part IV, that analysis is applied to Rule 4(k). Part V concludes
that, although provisions governing service of process are within the scope of the
Court's authority under the Rules Enabling Act, to the extent that Rule 4(k) purports
to alter the standards of amenability to jurisdiction, it impermissibly affects a
"substantive right" within the meaning of the Act, and is beyond the authority
conferred on the Court under that Act.

29. See id.
30. The rule has been challenged, although not yet in a case with a compelling factual and
procedural background. See Chew v. Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
948 (1998).
31. See Clinton v. City ofNew York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating the Line Item Veto
Act, 110 Stat. 1200, 2 U.S.C. § 691 (Supp. 111996)). For a discussion of the decision and its
implications for the validity of the REA's delegation to the Court of authority to cancel
statutory provisions, see Leslie M. Kelleher, Separation of Powers and Delegations of
Authority To Cancel Statutes in the Line Item Veto Act and the Rules EnablingAct, 68 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2000).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).
33. See Kelleher, supra note 1, at 108-20.
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II. THE ALLOCATION OF PROCEDURAL-RULEMAKING
AUTHORITY INTHE RULES ENABLING ACT
A. The ConstitutionalAllocation
of.Authority
Congress has broad constitutional authority to regulate procedure for the federal
courts. 4 That authority extends notjustto matters that are obviously procedural (that
is, concerned only with and affecting only the orderly administration, fairness or
efficiency of the judicial process) but also extends to those matters that fall "within
the uncertain area between substance and procedure, [but] are rationally capable of
classification as either."35 Thus, even in diversity cases, in which state substantive law
governs, 3 6 Congress has a great deal of power to regulate procedural matters,
regardless of their substantive impact, subject, perhaps, to largely undefined
federalism limits.37 Congress has exercised its power over federal courtprocedure not
just in statutes, but also by delegating to the Supreme Court, in the Rules Enabling
Act, the authority to promulgate rules of procedure.
Even in the absence of a congressional delegation of authority, the federal courts
have inherent constitutional authority to regulate procedure through procedural
common law pronouncements in cases and controversies, as part ofthejudicial power
vested in the judicial branch by Article III.38 Although the limits of the courts'

34. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 ("The Congress shall have Power... To
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The
Congress shall have Power ...To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States."); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472
(1965); Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 655 (1835); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1825).
35. Hanna,380 U.S. at 472.
IThe constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules
governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a
powerto regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between
substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.
36. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
37. See Kelleher, supranote 1, at 77-83.
38. See U.S. CONST. art. III. The courts' inherent authority to make procedural common
law pronouncements has been recognized by the Supreme Court in several decisions. See, e.g.,
Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (holding that trial court has inherent authority to issue
sanctions against a party for bad faith conduct); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472-73 (noting that there
are "matters which relate to the administration of legal proceedings, an area in which federal
courts have traditionally exerted strong inherent power, completely aside from the powers
Congress expressly conferred in the Rules [enactment process]") (citation omitted); Landis v.
North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936) (holding that federal court has inherent power to control
its own docket, including the power to stay proceedings in one suit pending the determination
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inherent authority are not fully defined,39 it is clear that a core part of the judicial
power, such as the power to sanction for contempt, may not be materially impaired
by Congress.40 Equally clear is that the greater part of the courts' authority to regulate
procedure is subject to congressional control or override,4 much in the same way that
substantive common law is subject to legislative and regulatory override.42
Congressional override or displacement of procedural common law can be in the
form of statutes, or in the form of rules promulgated by the Judicial Conference and
the Court pursuant to the authority delegated in the Rules Enabling Act. Just as
substantive common law may be limited, or displaced, by statutory regulation
sufficiently broad to "occupy the field,"43 statutes or rules of procedure can so

of another suit); ExparteBurr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530-31 (1824) (holding that trial court
has power to regulate the conduct of lawyers).
The Court has not clearly recognized an inherent authority in the judiciary to establish
general rules of procedure, and whether such an inherent power exists is the subject of
academic debate. Regardless, Congress has delegated to the Court the authority to promulgate
prospective rules of procedure in the REA. See Kelleher, supranote 1, at 66-68.
39. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1115-16 (1982).
40. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787,799 (1987) (recognizing that
the inherent contempt power of federal courts is subject to regulation by Congress, provided
that such regulation does not completely abrogate that power, or render it "'practically
inoperative') (quoting Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924)); see also
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts ofjustice from the
nature of their institution. .

.

. To fine for contempt-imprison for

contumacy-inforce [sic] the observance of order, &c.are powers which cannot
be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all
others: and so far our Courts no doubt possess powers not immediately derived
from statute ....
Id.; see Brainer v. United States, 691 F.2d 691, 697 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[W]e assume without
deciding that federal courts possess some measure of administrative independence such that
congressional intervention would, at some extreme point, 'pass[] the limit which separates the
legislative from the judicial power."') (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. v. Klein, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871)).
Consider also the views of Professors Levin and Amsterdam, who noted that "[tihere are
spheres of activity so fundamental and so necessary to a court, so inherent in its very nature
as a court, that to divest it of its absolute command within these spheres is to make meaningless
the very phrase judicial power," A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, LegislativeControl
over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30
(1958) (emphasis omitted); and of Professor Redish, "a specific procedural rule [enacted by
Congress] could so interfere with the courts' performance of the... adjudicatory process of
finding facts... as to invade the courts' judicial power under Article III," Martin H. Redish,
FederalJudicialIndependence:ConstitutionalandPoliticalPerspectives,
46 MERCERL. REV.

697, 725 (1995).
41. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1 (1825).
42. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV.

1(1975).
43. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that the 1972
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completely regulate a procedural matter as to leave no room for supplementation by
procedural common law. Thus, in Omni CapitalInternationalLtd. v. Rudolf Wolff&
Co.," the Court refused to fashion a common law rule authorizing service of
summons in a federal action "at this late date" on the ground that service was a field
completely occupied by statute and rule, stating that "as statutes and rules have
always provided the measures for service, courts are inappropriate forums for
deciding whether to extend them."4
B. The Allocation ofAuthority
in the Rules EnablingActThe "Substantive Right" Limitation
In the 1934 Rules Enabling Act, Congress delegated to the Supreme Court the
power to make prospective supervisory rules of procedure for federal courts.46

amendments to federal statutes governing water pollution narrowed the scope of federal
common law as defined in the earlier case of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972),
and that federal common law was now displaced, and could not be used to impose more
stringent standards than those set out in the amended statute and relevant regulations); see also
19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHTETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE § 4514 (2d ed. 1996);

Monaghan, supranote 42.
44.484 U.S. 97 (1987).
45. Id. at 110; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).
[O]f overriding importance, courts must be mindful that the rule as now
composed sets the requirements they are bound to enforce. Federal Rules take
effect after an extensive deliberative process involving many reviewers: a Rules
Advisory Committee, public commenters, the Judicial Conference, this Court, the
Congress ....

The text of a rule thus proposed and reviewed limits judicial

inventiveness. Courts are not free to amend a rule outside the process Congress
ordered ....
Id. (emphasis added).
46. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (repealed 1988), provided for
rules of civil procedure:
Be it enacted... [t]hat the Supreme Court of the United States shall have the
power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United States
and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs,
pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law.
Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any
litigant. They shall take effect six months after their promulgation, and thereafter
all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
Id.
Prior to 1988, authority to promulgate rules of evidence and rules of procedure in criminal
cases, criminal proceedings and bankruptcy proceedings was contained in separate statutes.
See, e.g., Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 2(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1926, 1948-49, amended
by Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-149, § 2, 89 Stat. 805, 806 (rules of evidence). These
Acts were repealed by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act (the 1988 Rules
Enabling Act), Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, §401(c), 102 Stat. 4642,4650 (1988); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2075 (1970) (amended 1978, 1994) (bankruptcy rules); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3771, 3772
(1970) (criminal procedure), which provided a uniform mechanism for promulgating rules of
procedure and evidence. The most complete history of the Rules Enabling Act can be found
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Section 2072 ofthe Act, as amended in 1988, allocates rulemaking authority between
Congress and the Court:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice
and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts
(including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws
in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect.47
Not surprisingly, given the judicial branch's inherent power over procedure, the
Court has found that the delegation in the Act is constitutionally permissible,48 and
long has rejected arguments that rulemaking power is a nonadjudicative, exclusively
legislative function that cannot be delegated to, and exercised by, the Court. 49 But the
Court never has ruled clearly on the constitutionality of the supersession provision
in the last sentence of subsection 2072(b), which effectively permits the Court to
repeal statutory provisions by promulgating rules of procedure. 0 The validity of that

in Burbank, supra note 39.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
48. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 387-88 (1989) (citing Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941)), for authority that delegation under the REA is an example of
a constitutionally permissible delegation to the Court); Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9-10 ("Congress
has undoubted powerto regulate the practice and procedure offederal courts, and may exercise
that power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent
with the statutes or constitution of the United States ....
) (footnote omitted); see also Robert
N. Clinton, Rule 9 ofthe FederalHabeasCorpusRules: A Case Study on the NeedforReform

of the Rules EnablingActs, 63 IowA L. REv. 15, 71-72 (1977) (concluding the delegation of
rulemaking authority in the REA is valid, but contesting the validity of the supersession
clause); Carole E. Goldberg, The Influence ofProceduralRules on FederalJurisdiction,28

STAN. L. REv. 395, 437-41 (1976) (concluding that the delegation in the REA is valid).
49. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825). For an argument that
rulemaking is an essentially legislative function that cannot be delegated to the Court, posited
by a long-time chair of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and a chief opponent of
uniform federal rules, see Thomas J.Walsh, Rule-Making Power on the Law Side of Federal

Practice,6 OR. L. REV. 1 (1926), reprintedin 13 A.B.A. J. 87 (1927). See also Martin H.
Redish, Separationof Powers,JudicialAuthority, andthe Scope ofArticle III: The Troubling

Cases ofMorrison and Mistretta, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 314-19 (1990) (arguing that the
delegation ofrulemaking power violates the doctrine of separation of powers, and arguing that
the Court in Sibbach did not rule directly on the validity of the REA under the case or
controversy requirement of Article III).
50. See Kelleher, supranote 31, at nn.268-69. In Clintonv. City ofNew York, 524 U.S. 417

(1998), the Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act's delegation to the President of authority
to repeal statutory provisions. In doing so, the Court appeared to assume the validity of the
supersession clause, which it distinguished from the Line Item Veto Act, on that ground that
in the REA's supersession clause, Congress itself made the decision to repeal inconsistent
statutes "upon the occurrence of aparticular event-here, the promulgation ofprocedural rules
by this Court." Id. at 2107 n.40. However, the grant of authority in the supersession clause
never was limited to the repeal of prior-enacted statutes. See Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the
Corks:A Comment on PaulCarrington's "Substance"and "Procedure"in the Rules Enabling
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clause in light of Article I's Presentment Clause"' and the doctrine of separation of
powers has been the subject of intense debate since the Rules Enabling Act first was
introduced in Congress. 2 The better view is that the supersession clause is valid,
provided that the "substantive right" limitation on the Court's authority to promulgate
rules is read in an appropriately narrowing manner, such that only rules that do not
implicate policy decisions in areas reserved by Congress are found valid, and capable
of superseding procedural statutes. 3
The meaning of the "substantive right" limitation, and the scope of the Court's
authority under the Act, however, have not been defined clearly, or consistently
respected, by the Court and by the rulemakers-the Judicial Conference and its
committees.' For many years it was widely, and erroneously, assumed that the Act's
prohibition of rules affecting substantive rights was intended primarily to further the
federalism principles reflected in the Erie line of decisions, and to prevent the
inappropriate displacement of state substantive law by federal rules. That popular
misconception was dispelled by Professor Burbank in his seminal study of the 1934
Rules Enabling Act."5 If any doubts remained, the purpose of the "substantive right"
limitation was made clear by the legislative history of the 1988 amendments to the
Act. 6 It now generally is understood that Congress's animating concern with the
Rules Enabling Act was the allocation of authority between Congress and the Court:
that the Court has been allocated only those decisions concerned with procedure, and
Congress has retained control over primary, substantive policy decisions. 7 This is not
to say that substantive state law is not afforded protection against inappropriate

displacement by rules of procedure. Any such protection, however, is an incidental
effect of Congress retaining for itself the power to make primary policy decisions,
including those that involve the displacement of state substantive law. 8

Act, 1989 DUKEL.J. 1012.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
52. See Burbank, supranote 39, at 1050-54; Burbank, supra note 50, at 1044 (arguing that
the supersession clause is invalid. But see Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure"
in the Rules EnablingAct, 1989 DuKE L.J. 281, 325 (arguing that the supersession clause is
valid); Clinton, supra note 48, at 65, 77.
53. A ccordRalph U. Whitten, Separation ofPowers RestrictionsonJudicialRulemaking:

A Case Study of FederalRule 4, 40 ME. L. REV. 41, 60-66 (1988). The validity of the
supersession clause is discussed in Kelleher, supranote 31, Part V.
54. See Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 1, at 482-93.
55. See Burbank, supra note 39.

56. See Burbank, supra note 50, at 1029-40. Professor Burbank appeared as an invited
witness at congressional hearings regarding the amendments to the Act, and provided other
assistance to the House Judiciary Committee in the development of the 1988 amendments. See
H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 7, 18-20 (1984), reprintedin 132 CONG. REc. E177-202 (daily ed.
Feb. 3, 1986) (House Committee Report accompanying a precursor bill to the 1988 statute that
amended the Rules Enabling Act); H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 7, 18 (1985) (technical and
typographical errors in the report were corrected at 132 CONG. REC. E177-202 (daily ed. Feb.
3, 1986)); see also Burbank, supranote 50, at 1012.
57. See Kelleher, supra note 1, at 92-94, 101-04.
58. See id. at 93 (noting that the REA "holds the potential to serve federalism values,
protecting both existing and potential state law by remitting to Congress the decision whether
there shall be prospective federal law on 'substantive' matters and the content of that law.")
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Although the Court acknowledged that the Rules Enabling Act imposed limits on
its rulemaking authority separate from and in addition to those found in the
Constitution, s° for years it failed to give those limits any independent meaning. With
few exceptions, the Court's opinions conflated the test for validity under the REA
with the "rationally capable of classification as procedural"' constitutional test for
Congress's authority to regulate procedure." After Congress amended the Rules
Enabling Act in 1988, however, the Court began to take the "substantive right"
limitation more seriously. Although the Court has yet to invalidate a rule as beyond
the Court's rulemaking authority under the REA, in several recent cases it has
accorded the limitations of that Act greater deference, at least as a rule of
construction, by reading rules narrowly to avoid running afoul of the prohibition
against rules affecting substantive rights.62 For example, in its 1991 decision in
Kamen v. Kemper FinancialServices, Inc., a unanimous Court read Rule 23.1 as not
addressing the substantive issue of whether a prior demand on the board was required
in a derivative suit.63 The Court stated that it was required to read the rule narrowly
to avoid infirmity, noting that "[i]ndeed, as a rule of procedure issued pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act, Rule 23.1 cannot be understood to 'abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right."'"
Despite its apparent willingness finally to effectuate the "substantive right"
limitation, the Court has not provided the rulemakers clear guidance as to the scope
of the rulemaking power. In an earlier article, this author proposed guidelines for
interpreting, and analyzing the validity of rules of procedure, consisting of a number
of factors that should be considered in determining whether a rule impermissibly
impacts substantive rights within the meaning of the REA, and intrudes into an area
reserved by Congress. Relevant factors may include: the extent to which Congress
has regulated the matter; the impact of the procedural rule on congressional policy;
whether the matter is one traditionally in the domain of the states; the transsubstantive nature of tm rule; the implication of policies extrinsic to the business of
the courts; and the importance of the matter to the orderly functioning of the courts.
The list is not intended to be exhaustive. Nor are all factors are equally important to
the analysis of the validity of all rules. In analyzing Rule 4(k), for example, the most
significant factors are the extent of regulation-not just by Congress, but by the
Constitution as well, and the implication of policies extrinsic to the business of the
courts. Before considering the validity of Rule 4(k), it will be helpful to examine the
background to the rule, and the circumstances surrounding its promulgation.

(citing Stephen B. Burbank, OfRules and Discretion:The Supreme Court,FederalRules and
the Common Law, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 693, 700-01 (1988)).
59. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965).
60. Id. at 472.
61. See Kelleher, supranote 1, at 94-100.
62. See id at 105-08.
63. 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
64. Id. at 96 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1990)).
65. See Kelleher, supranote 1, at 108-21.
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TII.THE 1993 AMENDMENT TO RULE 4
A. Background
Congress's authority to regulate procedure in federal courts includes power to
regulate the manner and method of service ofprocess, and Congress can, if it wishes,
provide for nationwide service in federal question cases, as well as diversity cases.'
Congress also has authority to regulate amenability to the jurisdiction of federal
courts.67 That authority, of course, is subject to constitutional limits. The Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause requires that service of process provide the
defendant with notice, "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action," and an opportunity to be heard and
present their objections.63 In addition, a defendant will not be amenable to the
jurisdiction of a federal court unless the Fifth Amendment requirement of sufficient
affiliating contacts between the defendant and the nation as a whole is satisfied.69
Congress has provided specifically for nationwide service in a limited number of
actions under federal law,7" but has not enacted a general nationwide service
provision. Those statutes in which Congress has provided for service often say
nothing about amenability to jurisdiction.7' Effecting service provides notice to the
defendant of the commencement of the action, and marks the court's assertion of
jurisdiction over the action.' Valid service, however, does not byitselfguarantee that
the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant; an assertion of personal
jurisdiction also must satisfyrelevant statutory and constitutional requirements." The

66. See Mississippi Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) (holding, in a
diversity case, that "Congress could provide for service of process anywhere in the United
States") (citations omitted).
67. See Robert C. Casad, PersonalJurisdictionin FederalQuestion Cases,70 TEx. L. REV.
1589, 1599-615 (1992).
68. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); see also, e.g.,
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (requirement of notice under Fifth
Amendment).
69. Other limitations on the assertion ofjurisdiction imposed by the Fifth Amendment are
discussed infra text accompanying notes 123-36.
70. See, e.g., Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1994) (providing
fornationwide service ofprocess); see also Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. §22 (1994) (providing
for worldwide service of process); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1994); Securities Act of 1933 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1994). For a list of federal statutes
providing for nationwide service of process, see Howard Erichson, Nationwide Personal
Jurisdictionin All FederalQuestion Cases:A NewRule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1123 n.30
(1989).
71. Some federal statutes expressly call for the application of national contacts test. See,
e.g., The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994).
72. See Paul D. Carrington, ContinuingWork on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE
DAM L. REv. 733, 733-34 (1988); Kent Sinclair, Service ofProcess:Amended Rule 4 and
the Presumption ofJurisdiction,14 REV. LING. 159, 163-65 (1994).
73. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1063, at 225; see also DeMelo v. Toche
Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1264 (5th Cir. 1983).
The concept of personal jurisdiction comprises two distinct components:
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separate issues of effective service ofprocess and amenability tojurisdiction often are
conflated, which has caused much confusion. Many courts, for example, have found,
or simply assumed without any real analysis, that nationwide service provisions
provide for nationwide personaljurisdiction as well, subject only to Fifth Amendment
limits of national contacts, rather than Fourteenth Amendment limits of forum state
contacts.74 While that result certainly seems consistent with congressional intent, and
is good policy, it would best be accompanied by recognition and acknowledgment
that Congress has left the amenability issue to be decided by the courts. Thus, the
courts must determine amenability issues as a matter of interstitial federal common
law, in a way that "implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is
conditioned by them,"" in much the same manner that the courts often must
determine limitations periods in the face of congressional silence.76
Much of Congress's power to regulate procedure has been delegated to the

amenability to jurisdiction and service of process. Amenability to jurisdiction
means that a defendant is within the substantive reach of a forum's jurisdiction
under applicable law. Service of process is simply the physical means by which
that jurisdiction is asserted.
Id. (citations omitted).
74. See, e.g., Leasco DataProcessing v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); Paulson Inv. Co. v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 613, 615 (D. Or.
1984) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Engineering Equip. Co. v. Waterside Ocean
Navigation Co., 446 F. Supp. 706,706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (admiralty case); cf Casad, supranote
67, at 1596 & n.36 (citing cases in which courts have held that the defendant served under a
federal statute providing for nationwide service nonetheless must have contacts with the forum
state in order for the court to assert personal jurisdiction, which he criticizes as "totally
inconsistent with congressional intent").
75. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,472 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
76. Cf RIcHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 820-29(4th ed. 1996) (discussing case law involving limitations periods

and other quasi-procedural issues in federal actions determined by courts in the face of
congressional silence); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1994) ("Except as otherwise provided by
law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of
this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.").
While this uniform limitations period was welcome, and long overdue, it unfortunately only
applies to actions arising under statutes enacted after 1990, when § 1658 was itself enacted.
Thus, in many federal question cases, the limitations period remains a matter of federal
decisional, or common, law. Of course, some matters governed by decisional law, such as the
doctrine of laches, have their origin in equity, and thus are not appropriately designated matters
of "common" law. However, as equity and common law are merged in federal courts, and for
ease of reference, the phrase "federal common law" as used in this Article encompasses such
equitable doctrines.
In diversity actions, however, the federal courts have no such authority to fashion common
law, as Congress has provided in the Rules of Decision Act that state law shall govern. Thus,
amenability to jurisdiction in diversity cases must be governed by state law, including the
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional standard for amenability to jurisdiction applicable to
state courts. See Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
709 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring); see alsoinfra text accompanying notes 105-09 (discussing
Insurance Corp. of Jr.).
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Supreme Court in the Rules Enabling Act. The extent to which Court-promulgated
rules could govern service of process was considered by the Court in Mississippi
PublishingCorp. v. Murphree." That case involved a challenge to the provision in
former Rule 4(f) for statewide service of process by the federal methods. Before the
Federal Rules came into effect in 1938, the Judiciary Act provided that a federal
district court could issue process in civil actions only within the district in which it
sat, absent a specific statutory authorization." When the Federal Rules became law
in 1938, they included Rule 4(f), which provided:
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial
limits of the state in which the district court is held and, when a statute of the
United States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state.
When this rule was first proposed, a concern was raised that it violated the
"substantive right" limitation ofthe Rules Enabling Act by extending the reach of the
district courts' personal jurisdiction beyond the limits imposed by the prior statutory
restrictions. The Advisory Committee thought not. The Committee, quite properly,
distinguished amenability to jurisdiction from service of process. The Committee
assumed that amenability was a substantive matter, and beyond the scope of
rulemaking authority, while it considered service a procedural matter, and thus a
proper subject for the rules. Dean Clark stated the views of the Committee:
The question has been raised whether this is not a substantive change, one
affectingjurisdiction and venue. I might say on that, it is our theory that definitely
it is not. This is not a matter of either the jurisdiction of the court, what matters
the court shall hear and decide, or of the venue, which is the place where certain
kinds of action shall be tried. This affects neither one of those points. It simply
says that in cases where the district court already has jurisdiction and venue its
process may reach as far as the confines of that state itself. In other words, that is
why we consider it procedural. It is simply allowing people to be brought before
the court within the entire state and not merely within one district.79
Rule 4(f) was challenged in Murphree as beyond the scope of the Court's
rulemaking authority under the REA. The action in that case was commenced in
diversity in the Northern District of Mississippi, but the defendant, a Delaware
corporation with an office in Mississippi, was served in the Southern District of
Mississippi, pursuant to Rule 4(f). The defendant challenged that provision as
violating the substantive rights restrictions of the Rules Enabling Act. The Court
upheld the provision, holding that "it serves only to implement the jurisdiction over
the subject matter which Congress has conferred, by providing a procedure by which
the defendant may be brought into court at the place where Congress has declared

77. 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
78. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2, 11, 1 Stat. 73; Robertson v. Railroad Labor
Bd., 268 U.S. 619 (1925); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300 (1838).
79. RULES OF CIvIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH
NoTES AND PROCEEDINGS OFTHE INSTITUTEON FEDERAL RULES 205-06 (William W. Dawson

ed. 1938) (remarks of Charles E. Clark, Reporter for Advisory Committee). From the context,
it is clear that the references to jurisdiction are to subject matter, rather than personal,
jurisdiction.
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that the suit may be maintained.""0 Rule 4(f), the Court concluded, "does not operate
to abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which the court will adjudicate
[the litigants'] rights. It relates merely to 'the manner and the means by which a right
to recover ...is enforced."''
The Court's statement of the standard for determining when rules ran afoul of the
2
REA's limitation was unduly generous, as were its other decisions on the issue.1
Nonetheless, the result in Murphree was correct. Rule 4(f) governed only
service-the procedural means of providing notice to, and asserting the jurisdiction
of the court over, the defendant for an adjudication of its substantive rights. The
provision had only a minimal, incidental effect on those rights. It did not purport to
govern amenability to jurisdiction, which was left to be determined by the courts as
a matter of interstitial federal common law, 3 subject to constitutional limits.
Similarly, the "bulge" rule in Rule 4(f)84 also was valid, even though it was the first
time that a rule, rather than a statute, permitted service of process outside of the state
in which the district court was situated. Under the "bulge" rule, service outside of the
state, but within 100 miles of the district courthouse, was permitted on persons
brought in as parties under Rules 14 or 19, and on persons required to respond to an
order of commitment for civil contempt. Again, although the reach of service was
extended, the "bulge" rule was not concerned with amenability to jurisdiction."5
Furthermore, that the methods and reach of service of process to that point had
been governed by statute did not make the matter "substantive" within the meaning
of the REA. Rather, Congress's intent to allocate to the Court authority over service
is evidenced by the reference to service of process in the original 1934 Act, which
specifically granted the Court "the power to prescribe, by general rules... the forms
of process."8 6 Congress contemplated that rules promulgated under the Act would

80. Murphree, 326 U.S. at 445.
81. Id. at 446 (omission in original) (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109
(1945)).
82. See Kelleher, supranote 1, at 95-105 (discussing, inter alia, the Court's decisions in
Murphree, 326 U.S. at 443, Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941), and Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965), and noting that the Court failed to recognize any meaningful limits on its
rulemaking authority under the REA).
83. Cf LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 364-65 & nn.432-35
(1994) (listing cases).
84. Former Rule 4(f) provided, in relevant part, that
persons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 14, or as additional parties
to a pending action or a counterclaim or cross-claim therein pursuant to Rule 19,
may be served [with the federal methods] outside the state but within the United
States that are not more than 100 miles from the place in which the action is
commenced, or to which it is assigned or transferred for trial; and persons
required to respond to an order for commitment for civil contempt may be served
at the same places.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (repealed 1993).
85. Cf TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 83, at 457 (arguing that the expansion of the
territorial reach of service in the bulge rule also is justified as furthering important federal
subject-matter jurisdiction policies).
86. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (repealed 1988).
Be it enacted . . . [t]hat the Supreme Court of the United States shall have the
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supersede procedural statutes, and provided in the supersession clause that "all laws
in conflict" with rules promulgated by the Court under the Act "shall be of no further
'
The service provisions of the Judiciary Act were among the
force or effect."87
statutory provisions governing procedure that Congress intended to be, and which
were, properly superseded by the rules.88 That Congress was of that opinion is
evidenced by the fact that in 1948, when the successor to that provision was revised
by Congress, the territorial limitation on service of process was eliminated. 9 In
contrast, as discussed below, amenability to jurisdiction is a substantive matter
beyond the rulemaking authority allocated to the Court in the REA.
B. The Former (Pre-1993)Rule 4
and the Omni Case
Absent a specific statutory provision, service ofprocess in federal court is governed
by the general service provisions of Rule 4. Before the 1993 amendment, Rule 4(f)
provided that service of process using the federal methods authorized in the rule
could be effected only within the territorial limits of the state in which the district
court was located." Service of a summons outside of the forum state was governed

power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United States
and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs,
pleadings and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law.
.Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any
litigant. They shall take effect six months after their promulgation, and thereafter
all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
Id. It could be objected that rules involving the territorial reach of service of process involve
more than simply the "forms of process." Similarly, manner of service is something separate
from the "form." Both manner of service and its territorial reach, however, are sufficiently
closely related to its form, whereas amenability to jurisdiction is much further removed, and
implicates directly a constitutional right.
87. Id.
88. See generally Kelleher, supra note 31, Part V.
89. See Omni Capital Int'l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 109 n.10 (1987)
(citing Judiciary Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (1948)).
Nor has the fairly pervasive congressional regulation of service of process removed the
matter from the scope ofthe Court's rulemaking authority, although pervasive regulation often
is an indication of congressional intent to do so. See Kelleher, supra note 1,at 109-13. Rather,
because service of process cannot be effected without positive authority in a statute or rule, see
Omni, 484 U.S. at 108-11, and because it is so important to the functioning of the courts,
Congress should be taken to have intended that rules concerning service would be promulgated
to govern those actions in which Congress failed to provide specifically for service. For a
similar argument with respect to the validity of rules governing pleading, see Kelleher, supra
note 1, at 109-10.
90. The federal methods of service were unchanged by the 1993 amendments, but now are
available in any judicial district in the United States. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), which provides
that
service upon an individual ... other than an infant or incompetent person, may
be effected in any judicial district of the United States... (2) by delivering a
copy of the summons and complaint to the individual personally or by leaving
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by the former Rule 4(e), which provided that, absent a specific federal service statute,
service outside of the state was to be "made under the circumstances and in the
manner prescribed" by the forum state's long-arm service statute or rule. 91
A problem arose with the incorporation of state service statutes and rules in the
Federal Rules. When a federal statute creating a civil cause of action did not also
provide for nationwide service, a plaintiff had to use the forum state method of
service to effect service outside of the state in which the district court was located. If
the state statute or rule did not permit service on the defendant, the plaintiff could not
effect service and thus was unable to commence the action. This was the situation in
Omni CapitalInternationalLtd.v. RudolfWolff& Co. :92 because the defendants were
not within the reach of the forum state's long-arm jurisdiction statute, they were not
subject to service under the forum state's long-arm service provision.
In Omni, a British corporation and its agent, who was a British citizen and resident,
were impleaded in an action in a federal court in Louisiana under the federal
Commodities Exchange Act. The Commodities Exchange Act had no service
provision, as the action was an implied private right of action. The district court
dismissed the case, concluding that although the British defendants had sufficient
contacts with the United States to satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment,
they did not have sufficient contacts with Louisiana to satisfy the requirements of the
state long-arm jurisdiction statute, so that service could not be effected "under the
'
circumstances and in the manner prescribed" 93
by the state law, and the action had to
be dismissed. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed, although a minority was
prepared to find authority to serve the summons in federal common law to correct
what it characterized as a "bizarre hiatus in the Federal Rules." ' The Supreme Court
sided with the majority, holding that service failed because it could not be effected
under the Louisiana long-arm statute and there was no federal method of serving the
defendants. In making its ruling, the Court invited action by Congress or the
rulemakers:

copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by delivering
a copy of the summons and the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process.
Id.; see also id. 4(h) (providing for service upon corporations and associations).
91. The former Rule 4(e) provided:
Whenever a statute or rule of the court of the state in which the district court is
held provides (1) for service of a summons.., upon a party not an inhabitant of
or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to such a party to
appear and respond or defend in an action by reason of the attachment or
garnishment or similar seizure of the party's property located within the state,
service may in either case be made under the circumstances and in the manner
prescribed in the statute or rule.
Id. 4(e) (repealed 1993). The substance of this provision, and of the "bulge"rule in the former
Rule 4(f), providing for service outside of the forum state, is now contained in Rule 4(k)(1).
92. 484 U.S. 97 (1987).
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (repealed 1993).
94. Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l Ltd., 795 F.2d 415,428 (5th Cir. 1986), afld,
Omni, 484 U.S. 97.
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We are not blind to the consequences of the inability to serve process.... A
narrowly tailored service of process provision, authorizing service on an alien in
a federal-question case when the alien is not amenable to service under the
applicable state long-arm statute, might well serve the ends of the CEA and other
federal statutes. It is not for the federal courts, however, to create such a rule as
a matter of common law. That responsibility, in our view, better rests with those
who propose the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with Congress.95
As discussed below, the 1993 Rule 4(k) originally was intended to fill the gap in the
Federal Rule through which the defendants in Omni had managed to slip. But rather
than doing so with a nationwide service provision, which would have been

permissible under the REA, Rule 4(k) purports to govern amenability to jurisdiction,
and is invalid.
Another question that arose under Rule 4(e) was whether, in addition to limitations
on service and assertions ofjurisdiction imposed by state statutes and rules, Rule 4(e)
made applicable to federal courts the constitutional limitations on state court

assertions ofjurisdiction. An assertion ofjurisdiction by a state court is subject to the
limits imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, as
interpreted by the Court in InternationalShoe" and its progeny,97 requires that there
be sufficient purposeful contacts of the defendant with the forum state "such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."'' 8 The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the federal
government, however. Any direct constitutional limits on the jurisdictional reach of
a federal court are derived from the Fifth Amendment, which, most courts have held,
requires sufficient affiliating contacts between the defendant and the United States
as a whole, not just the forum state.' It was unclear whether, when a defendant in

95. Omni, 484 U.S. at I11.
96. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
97. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984); WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the Fourteenth Amendment limits on the assertion ofjurisdiction, see
generally William M. Richman, UnderstandingPersonalJurisdiction,25 ARIz.ST. L.J. 599
(1993).
98. InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
99. See, e.g., In re Application to Enforce Admin. Subpoenas Duces Tecum of the SEC,
87 F.3d 413 (10th Cir. 1996) (considering the issue in the context of 1993 amended Rule
4(k)(2)); Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O'Brien, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 n.4 (5th Cir. 1994)
(stating that every court that has considered the issue since 1982 has affirmed the national
contacts approach); United Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 985 F.2d 1320 (6th Cir. 1993); GoVideo Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989); Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc.,
834 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988); Hogue v. Milodon Eng'g,
Inc., 736 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1984); FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. Unit A
July 1981); Mariash v. Morril, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974); PHILIP I.
BLUMBERG, THE LAW
OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY

CORPORATIoNs § 3.04, at 52 n.10 (1983) (collecting cases); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
8, § 1067.1, at 318 n.44 (collecting cases).
The Supreme Court declined to consider the issue in Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113, n.*, stating,
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federal court was served pursuant to the forum state's long-arm statute, the personal
jurisdiction of the court was limited by the national contacts test of the Fifth
Amendment, orby the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of minimum contacts with
the forum state. Many courts, conflating the issues of service and amenability to
jurisdiction, erroneously assumed that Rule 4 governedboth.'° Those courts held that
the former Rule 4(e) incorporated not only the limits on service found in state law,
but also incorporated and imposed on federal courts the limits on jurisdiction found
in the Fourteenth Amendment, both in diversity actions and in actions under federal
law. Thus, for personal jurisdiction to attach, not only did service have to satisfy the
requirements of the state long-arm service and jurisdiction provisions, but the
defendant also had to have contacts with the forum state sufficient to satisfy the
Fourteenth Amendment.''
A number of federal courts had read the former Rule 4(e) as incorporating
Fourteenth Amendment limitations on territorial jurisdiction only when the action
was brought in diversity, and not when it involved a federal question, even though
process was served pursuant to a state long-arm statute. These courts were of the view

"[w]e have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due
Process Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personaljurisdiction over alien
defendants based on the aggregate of [national] contacts, rather than on the contacts between
the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits." (emphasis omitted). Subsequently,
in Republic ofArgentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 620 (1992), the Court appeared to use a
nationwide contacts test in an action against Argentina, holding that Argentina had
"purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the [United
States]." Although a breach of contract action, jurisdiction in that case was asserted under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994), which subjects
foreign states to suit in American courts for, inter alia, acts taken "in connection with a
commercial activity" that have "a direct effect in the United States," id. § 1605(a)(2), the Fifth
Amendment standard. While the Court seemed in the quoted language to endorse the view that
nationwide contacts can support an assertion ofjurisdiction by a district court, it did not so
clearly decide that issue, as the action was commenced in New York, the state with which
Argentina had contacts. Thus, the Court has not yet decided clearly whether, under a Fifth
Amendment nationwide-contacts standard, jurisdiction may be asserted by a federal court in
a situation in which the affiliating contacts are with a state other than the forum state, so that
the Fourteenth Amendment standard is not satisfied. For a discussion of whether the Fifth
Amendment imposes additional limits on assertions of jurisdiction, see also infra text
accompanying notes 123-36.
100. Cf Gary B. Born, Reflections on JudicialJurisdictionin InternationalCases, 17 GA.
J.INT'L & COMp. L. 1, 6 n.23 (1987) ("[F]ederal courts sitting in diversity actions will apply
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment... presumably on the grounds that it,
like state statutory law, is incorporated by Rule 4.") (citing Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l,
320 F.2d 219, 231-33 (2d Cir. 1963)).
101. See, e.g., United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp.,
960 F.2d 1080 (1st Cir. 1992); Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied,474 U.S. 980 (1985); DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (5th Cir.
1983). See generally Gary B. Bor & Andrew N. Volimer, The Effect ofthe Revised Federal
Rules of Civil Procedureon PersonalJurisdiction,Service and Discovery in International
Cases, 150 F.R.D. 221, 224 (1993); Lisa Rouchell, Federal Question Jurisdiction:Must a
DefendantHave Minimum Contactswith the State Whose Long-Arm Statute Is Used To Serve
Process?,54 LA. L. REv. 407 (1993).
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that any constitutional limits on the defendant's amenability to jurisdiction in federal
question cases derived from the Fifth Amendment's "national contacts"
requirement, 2 and that no further limits were imposed by Rule 4(e). One criticism
of the minority approach was that it simply ignored that Rule 4(e) itself did not
differentiate between diversity and federal question cases.0 3 This criticismwas valid;
the rule did not make any such distinctions. Nonetheless, the conclusion reached by
these courts was correct, but for different reasons. Rule 4(e) did not govern the issue
of amenability to jurisdiction at all, and could not have done so without violating the
REA's prohibition on rules affecting substantive rights.' 4 Rather, the standard for
amenability to jurisdiction is a matter that may be altered only by Congress, subject
to the limits of the Constitution.
Justice Powell's analysis in his concurring opinion in InsuranceCorp. ofIreland
v. Compagniedes Bauxites de Guinee'° recognized this point. Justice Powell argued
that, in diversity cases, Congress, with the Rules of Decision Act ("RDA"), ° had
imposed on federal courts the state-contacts limit on assertions of jurisdiction that
applied to state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Powell cited the
RDA's provision that state law is to govern in diversity cases in federal court as the
statutory basis of the requirement, articulated in Rule 4(e), that "the personal
jurisdiction of the district courts is determined in diversity cases by the law of the
forum State." Thus, Justice Powell noted, the ability of federal district courts to assert
jurisdiction over a defendant "normally would be subject to the same due process
limitations as a state court."' °7 Later in his opinion, Justice Powell again emphasized
that
[b]ecause of the District Court's reliance on the [forum state's] long-arm
statute-the applicable jurisdictional provision under the Rules of Decision
Act-the relevant constitutional limits would not be those imposed directly on
federal courts by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but those
applicable to state jurisdictional law under the Fourteenth.'
Thus, Justice Powell interpreted the RDA's reference to "law of the forum state"

102. See, e.g., Handley v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing
cases); see also Born & Vollmer, supra note 101, at 223-24 (collecting cases); BLUMBERG,
supra note 99, § 3.04 (collecting cases); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, at 318 n.44
(collecting cases). For a discussion of the Fifth Amendment's limitations on assertions of
jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying notes 123-36.
103. SeeHandley, 732 F.2d at 1272 (Krupansky, J., dissenting) ("On its face, rule 4(e) offers
no support for the majority's conclusion that'... a federal district court considering a case that
arises under federal law is not subject to precisely the same due process limitations which
restrict its reach in diversity cases.") (omission in original) (quoting id. at 1268).
104. See ifiraPart IV.
105. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994) provides: "The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Act of Congress otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as [the] rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States,
in cases where they apply."
107. InsuranceCorp. oflr., 456 U.S. at 712.
108. Id. at 713.
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as incorporating, and imposing on federal courts, not only the state statutory limits
on the assertion ofjurisdiction, but also state-contacts requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As Justice Powell recognized, the constitutional constraint that operates
directly on federal courts is that of the Fifth Amendment. Under the test enunciated
by the Court in Hanna,Congress has authority to legislate with respect to all matters
in cases in federal courts that are "rationally capable of classification as
[procedural.]""' Thus, Congress can alter the standard of amenability to jurisdiction,
so long as it does not attempt to provide less protection to the defendant than is
afforded by the Constitution. Imposing the Fourteenth Amendment state-contact
standard on federal courts affords greater protection to defendants than they otherwise
would have, and thus it clearly is within Congress's authority to do so, and Congress
has done so with the RDA's proscription that state law applies.
In an oft-cited article published several years ago, Professor Abraham suggested
that principles of federalism articulated in Eriemay limit Congress's power to give
the federal courts nationwide jurisdiction in diversity cases, and may mandate the
application of Fourteenth Amendment due process limits on federal courts sitting in
diversity.'" The Erie doctrine, however, is not so much concerned with the limits on
Congress's power to displace state law as it is concerned with the limits on the federal
courts' power to displace state law. That case "establishes that there are greater
constitutional limits on the federal courts' common law making powers than on the
legislative authority of Congress--that the federal courts' common law making power
is not coextensive with Congress's.""' Thus, a federal court in a diversity case may
not displace state law with its common law making power in every situation in which
Congress could displace state law by statute. Whereas Congress, exercising its
Commerce Clause power, could have provided foranegligence standard for interstate
railroads to apply in the situation presented in Erie, the federal court could not
displace state law without congressional authorization. One might argue, by
extension, that even without the proscription of the RDA, a federal court could not
displace the Fourteenth Amendment state-contact standard that would apply in a state
court. Even that proposition is dubious, however, because in the sense used in Erie,
the Fourteenth Amendment is not truly state law, but federal constitutional law, and
it is the Fifth, and not the Fourteenth, Amendment that by its terms applies to the
federal government. Regardless, it does not follow from Erie that Congress cannot
by legislation provide a nationwide amenability standard for diversity cases, as it has
done for interpleader actions." 2

109. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
110. See Gerald Abraham, ConstitutionalLimitationsupon the TerritorialReach ofFederal
Process, 8 VILL. L. REv. 520, 523-31 (1963). In an otherwise admirable piece, Professor
Abraham, unfortunately, makes the all-too-common error of conflating the issues of service
of process and amenability to jurisdiction.
111. Kelleher, supra note 1, at 73.
112. While Congress has not explicitly provided for nationwide amenability to jurisdiction
in statutory interpleader actions, it has provided for nationwide service of process. See 28
U.S.C. § 2361 (1994). As with other nationwide service provisions, courts have proceeded on
the assumption that this provision provides a national contacts amenability standard. See, e.g.,
Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970); New Jersey Sports Prods. v. Don
King Prods., 15 F. Supp. 2d 534 (D.N.J. 1998).
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The Supreme Court has assumed, without analysis, that in diversity cases the
Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts analysis of jurisdiction is applicable to
federal courts."3 However, it expressly has left open the question of the appropriate
constitutional analysis of jurisdictional limits in federal question cases in which
service was made pursuant to state law, as required by the former Rule 4(e). In Omni,
a federal question case, the Court found that it did not have to decide whether, under
the Fifth Amendment, aggregate contacts with the nation as a whole could be used
as the basis for the exercise of federal court jurisdiction. Rather, the case was
determined on the ground that the district court could not exercise jurisdiction over
the defendants without authorization to serve process. As the defendants did not have
sufficient contacts with the state to satisfy the state's long-arm jurisdictional statute,
4
service was not available under state law, which was to be used under Rule 4(e)."
There are strong policy reasons for limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts in
diversity cases to that which could be exercised by state courts. Inter-system forum
shopping is discouraged, as a plaintiff cannot sue infederal court a defendant that he
could not sue in state court. In addition, application of the Fourteenth Amendment
requirement of forum state contacts protects not only the individual defendant, but,
to the extent it is rooted in state territorial sovereignty,"115 it also ensures the protection
of state interests and interstate federalism." 6 As Professor Silberman has pointed out,

113. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). In Rudzewicz, the
defendants were served outside of the forum state in accordance with Rule 4(e).
114. See Omni Capital Int'l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987); see also Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987).
115. See Casad, supra note 67, at 1591-96.
116. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,292,294 (1980), Justice

White, writing for the Court, noted that the territorial jurisdiction of the states is limited by
"their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system," and that "even if the forum State is the
most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment." Three years later, however, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des

Bauxitesde Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 & n. 10 (1982), Justice White, again writing for the
Court, held that the requirement of personal jurisdiction could be waived, and rejected
territorial sovereignty as an element of the due process analysis:
The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual
liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of
sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.... The restriction on state
sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.... must be seen

as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due
Process Clause.
Id.

Nonetheless, Professor Casad and others argue persuasively that the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause actually has little bearing on personal jurisdiction, and that the source of
limitations on the state courts' ability to assertjurisdiction is the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and unarticulated principles of interstate federalism.
Thus, Professor Casad argues that "[tihe limits on state choice of law and the exercise of
personaljurisdiction are probably betterviewed as manifestations ofinterstate federalism," and
that "the limitations on state court jurisdiction that the Supreme Court has recognized in the
name of due process are at least in some respect based upon the territorial limits of the state's
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the state contacts test operates also as a "disguised regulator of choice-of-law
power.""' 7 These concerns are absent in actions governed by substantive federal
law." 8 Furthermore, the RDA, which requires federal courts to apply state substantive
law on amenability to jurisdiction, including Fourteenth Amendment limitations," 9
does not apply to actions under federal law. And former Rule 4(e) did not-as it
could not-govern amenability to jurisdiction. Thus, the better view is that, in federal
question cases, the relevant affiliating contacts are those with the nation, rather than
the forum state.
C. The Amended (1993) Rule 4(k)
The 1993 amended Rule 4(k) was intended to fill the "bizarre hiatus" in federal law
that presented itself in cases such as Omni, 2 ' where no nationwide service was
available for an action under federal law. It is not, however, a narrowly drafted
provision concerning only service, along the lines suggested by the Supreme Court
in Omni. Rather, the amended Rule 4(k) now explicitly purports to govern not only

sovereignty." Casad, supranote 67, at 1591, 1600.
Regardless of the sources and nature of the limits on assertions ofjurisdiction by federal and
state courts, courts and commentators ordinarily proceed on the assumption that those limits
emanate (at least in part) from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively, and these
assumptions are made in this Article as well.
117. Linda Silberman, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presumptive
Rules of Jurisdictionand Their Implicationsfor Choice ofLaw, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 587
(1991).

118. See Casad, supra note 67, at 1596, 1600.
Considerations of importance to Fourteenth Amendment due process-interstate
federalism and protection of state interests-are irrelevant in federal question
cases. There is no need in such cases to impose limits on the ability to acquire
personal jurisdiction as a hidden method of controlling choice of law because
national law defines the rights of the parties.... There are factors that limit the
range of a state's legislative and judicial jurisdiction but have no relevance when
applied to federal courts in federal question cases. The view that Fifth
Amendment due process requires state contacts, then, must be rejected.
Id.; see also United Rope Distribs., Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine, Inc., 930 F.2d 532, 535 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("State-federal allocations would be thrown out of kilter if a federal court could give
judgment in a diversity case that the state itself would have to dismiss. That rationale does not
carry over to federal question cases."); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
JurisdictiontoAdjudicate:A SuggestedAnalysis, 79HARv. L.REv. 1121, 1123-25 n.6 (1966)

("[A]ny given state necessarily views the jurisdictional problem from the perspective of its
community, but, insofar as federal-law questions are concerned, the appropriate community
may become the nation as a whole."); cf.Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise
ofJurisdictionover and Enforcement ofJudgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS

L.J. 799, 817-24 (1988) (arguing that nationwide contacts should be considered in all suits
against nonresident aliens).
119. See InsuranceCorp. ofIr., 456 U.S. at 711-12 (Powell, J., concurring).
120. See Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
H.R. Doc. No. 103-74, at 168 (1993), providing, "This paragraph [Rule 4(k)(2)] corrects agap
in the enforcement of federal law .... In this respect, the revision responds to the suggestion
of the Supreme Court made in Omni.. .."
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service, but also amenability to jurisdiction, which to that point had been left for
determination by the courts on a case-by-case basis, interpreting the Constitution and
congressional intent. It certainly is desirable to have the issues of service of process
and amenability tojurisdiction clearly separated, as they often were confused both by
courts and commentators.' 2 ' But a Court-promulgated Rule of Procedure cannot deal
with amenability, because, as discussed in Part IV, below, amenability is a substantive
matter beyond the scope of authority granted to the Court in the Rules Enabling Act.
The amended Rule 4 includes a new, nationwide long-arm service provision, which
provides that service of process now may be made in any judicial district of the
United States pursuant to the federal methods, pursuant to the law of the state in
which the district court sits, or pursuant to the law of the state in which service is
effected.' Rule 4(k) explicitly recognizes that effecting proper service is not in itself
sufficient to establish the personal jurisdiction of the court. The rule then purports to
set out the standards for amenability to jurisdiction. Under Rule 4(k)(1)(A), service
of the summons establishes jurisdiction over a defendant only ifthe defendant "could
be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which
the district court is located." That is, both in diversity and federal question cases, a
federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if a
state court of general jurisdiction in the forum state could do so. A state court cannot
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless the jurisdictional requirements
of the state's long-arm statute are met, and there are sufficient affiliating contacts
between the defendant and the forum state to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment. The
effect is much the same as under the majority application of the former Rule 4(e)
under the majority interpretation: the limitations on jurisdiction of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process clause, as well as the limitations of the forum state's longarm jurisdictional statute, are incorporated by the rule, and apply to both diversity and
federal question actions in federal courts.' That this was the intent of the Advisory
Committee seems apparent from the notes accompanying the rule, which state that
"[p]aragraph [4(k)](1) retains the substance of the former rule in explicitly
authorizing the exercise of personal jurisdiction over persons who can be reached
under state long-arm law."' 4

121. Cf Erichson, supra note 70, at 1119 ("The disentangling of these doctrines is sorely
needed.").
122. See, for example, FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), which provides that service on an individual,
other than an infant or incompetent person, can be made in any judicial district in the United
States pursuantto the federal method set out in Rule 4(e)(2) or, under Rule 4 (e)(1), "pursuant
to the law of the state in which the district court is located, or in which service is
effected ... ." See also id. 4(h) (service on corporations and associations).
123. See, e.g., L.H. Carbide Corp. v. Piece Maker Co., 825 F. Supp. 1425 (N.D. Ind. 1994);
Apr.
Unison Indus., L.P. v. Lucas Indus., PLC, No. 93-C-20249, 1994 WL 148718 (N.D. Ill.
22, 1994). As noted, the application of state law and Fourteenth Amendment limitations on
assertions ofjurisdiction in federal courts is a function of the application of the RDA, which
is not applicable to federal actions. Thus, in federal question actions, the nationwide contacts
test of the Fifth Amendment is applicable.
124. H.R. Doc. No. 103-74, at 167. The remainder of subdivision 4(k)(1) provides that
personaljurisdiction extends to parties added under Rules 14 and 19 who are served within 100
miles of the court (the "bulge rule"), to parties served under the Federal Interpleader Act, and
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Rule 4(k)(2) is a long-arm jurisdiction provision for a limited number of actions
arising under federal law:
If the exercise ofjurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective,
with respect to claims arising under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction
over the person of any defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of general jurisdiction of any state."
The constitutional limits referred to in the rule are those found in the Fifth
Amendment,' 26 which, it generally is accepted, requires sufficient affiliating contacts
with the nation as a whole, rather than just the forum state.' 27 The rationale of this
approach is that the sovereign exercising jurisdiction is the United States, whose
jurisdictional reach of which is not limited by the interests of "co-equal sovereigns"
in the way that the jurisdictional reach of state courts is limited. '
A number of courts have held that the Fifth Amendment requires more than just
affiliating contacts with the nation, and have applied a "basic fairness standard" for
determining amenability to jurisdiction. Under this test, the inconvenience to the
defendant of litigating in a particular venue within the United States must also be
considered.' 29 Some courts and commentators have argued that this basic fairness
analysis is the only approach logically consistent with the Supreme Court's decision

to defendants served under federal legislation that provides for nationwide or worldwide
service in actions under specific federal laws.
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
126. See H.R. DOc No. 103-74, at 168.
There remain constitutional limitations on the exercise of territorial jurisdiction
by federal courts over persons outside the United States. These restrictions arise
from the Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, which limits
state-court reach and which was incorporated into federal practice by the
reference to state law in the text of the former subdivision (e) that is deleted by
this revision. The Fifth Amendment requires that any defendant have affiliating
contacts with the United States sufficient to justify the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over that party.
Id.
127. See id.; see also supra note 99.

128. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
129. The leading cases to have adopted this test are Oxford FirstCorp. v. PNCLiquidating
Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974), and Deamesv. Magnificent Carriers,654 F.2d 280,

286 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981). The court in DeJanes,an admiralty case, states, in dicta, that "we are
not sure that some geographic limit short of the entire United States might not be incorporated
into the 'fairness' component of the [F]ifth [A]mendment," and cites the Oxford case. Id. The
Advisory Committee notes to the 1993 Rule 4 cite the DeJames case favorably for the
proposition that there may be some constitutional limits on choice of venue. "[A] plaintiff's
forum selection might be so inconvenient to a defendant that it would be a denial of 'fair play
and substantial justice' required by the due process clause, even though the defendant had
sufficient affiliating contacts with the United States." H.R. Doc No. 103-74, at 168-69 (1993).
For a discussion of the basic fairness standard, see Casad, supra note 67, at 1601-06, and
Kelleher, supra note 2, at 51-53.
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in InsuranceCorp. of Irelandv. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,'3 ° in which the

Court rejected territorial sovereignty as an element of the due process analysis, and
emphasized its goal of protecting the individual liberty interest of the defendant.,
Most courts have rejected the notion that even when sufficient affiliating contacts
with the nation exist, the Fifth Amendment affords the defendant some additional
protection from an inconvenient venue within the United States. These courts hold
that the defendant's right to a fair forum is adequately protected by statutory venue
and transfer provisions, and is not a constitutional issue. 3 But the Advisory
Committee apparently shared the minority view.'33 In the notes accompanying Rule
4(k), the Committee noted that while statutory venue'34 and transfer'35 provisions
normally will afford a defendant sufficient protection from an inconvenient forum,
alien defendants may be sued in any district. The Committee then stated that "a
plaintiff's forum selection might be so inconvenient to a defendant that it would be
a denial of 'fair play and substantial justice' required by the due process clause, even
' 36
though the defendant had significant affiliating contacts with the United States."'
It should be emphasized that Rule 4(k)(2) is a fall-back provision, which is to be
used to establish personal jurisdiction only in a small number of federal question
cases. It applies only when there is no state in which the defendant is subject to

130. 456 U.S. 694 (1982); see supra note 116.
131. See GRM v. Equine Inv. & Management Group, 596 F. Supp. 307, 314 (S.D. Tex.
1984); Maryellen Fullerton, ConstitutionalLimits on NationwidePersonalJurisdictionin the

FederalCourts, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 14-21 (1984). For a discussion of the Court's decision
in InsuranceCorp. ofJr., see also supra note 116.

132. See, e.g., Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir.
1984) (holding that in federal actions, the "nonconstitutional doctrine of forum non
conveniens" protects a litigant's right to a fair forum), dismissed on remand,626 F. Supp. 718
(D.P.R. 1985), aff'd, 804 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1986); Hogue v. Mildon Eng'g, Inc., 736 F.2d
989,991 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that fairness ofjurisdiction by a bankruptcy court is a federal
venue issue and not a constitutional issue); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330,334 (7th Cir.
1979) (rejecting analysis of Oxford, see supranote 129); see also Casad, supra note 67, at
1605-06 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decisions in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S.
604 (1990), and in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 449 U.S. 585 (1991), lend indirect support
to the majority view).
133. See H.R. DocNo. 103-74, at 168-69.
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1994).
135. See id. § 1404.
136. H.R. Doc. No. 103-74, at 168-69. In support, the Committee cites DeJames v.
Magnificent Carriers,Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 286-87 n.3 (3d Cir. 1974). The court of appeals in
DeJames stated in dicta that "we are not sure that some geographic limit short of the entire
United States might not be incorporated into the 'fairness' component of the [F]ifth
[A]mendment," and cited Oxford. See supranote 129.
Additional support for the Committee's position can be found in Kevin M. Clermont,
Restating TerritorialJurisdictionand Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 411, 431-41 (1981); Robert A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process
Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REV. 1, 32-40 (1988). See also Lea
Briimayer & Charles Norchi, FederalExtraterritorialityandFifth Amendment Due Process,

105 HARv.L. REV. 1217, 1262 (1992) (arguing that Fifth Amendment due process limits
should be generally "parallel to those of the Fourteenth Amendment").
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personal jurisdiction, whether because the defendant does not have sufficient
minimum contacts with any one state to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment, or
because the state with which the defendant has sufficient contacts does not have a
long-arm jurisdictional statute that can reach the defendant. Ironically, as one
commentator has pointed out, because the defendants in Omni likely would have been
amenable to jurisdiction in a New York court, the provisions of Rule 4(k) would not
have been applicable to them.' 37 With few exceptions, Rule 4(k)(2) will apply only
in cases involving foreign defendants domiciled outside of,' and served outside
of,'39 the United States. 4 °

137. See Dora A. Corby, PuttingPersonalJurisdictionWithin Reach: Just What Has Rule
4(k)(2) Donefor the PersonalJurisdictionof FederalCourts?, 30 MCGEoRGE L. REv. 167,

186-90 (1998).
138. Cf. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1940). In Milliken, the Supreme Court
found that a Wyoming court constitutionally could assert personal jurisdiction over the
defendant Meyer, a Wyoming resident who was served in Colorado, pursuant to a Wyoming
statute that permitted service out of state on absent residents. See id. at 463. In its ruling, the
Court referred to citizenship, domicile, and residence, interchangeably, as justifying the
assertion of jurisdiction. In its ruling, the Court stated, "[t]he state which accords ... [the
defendant] privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile
may also exact reciprocal duties." Id. This reasoning would seem to apply with equal force to
alien domiciliaries. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 118, at 803 n.20.
139. If an individual defendant, including a nonresident alien, is personally served within
a state, even in a suit unrelated to the activities of the defendant in that state, it appears that the
state can assert "transient" jurisdiction over that defendant. See Bumham v. Superior Court,
495 U.S. 604, 610-19 (1990). In Burnham, the defendant husband was served personally with
a summons and divorce petition while in California for three days for business reasons, and
to visit his children, who lived in California with his estranged wife. The marital domicile had
been in New Jersey. The Supreme Court unanimously held that California could assert personal
jurisdiction, but there were two plurality opinions for four Justices, and one other concurrence
by Justice White. Justice Scalia, writing for four Justices, found that jurisdiction could be
established by service within the state, regardless of the contacts of the defendant with the
state, as this was a traditional method of establishing jurisdiction, and thus did not offend
traditional Fourteenth Amendment requirements of fair play and substantial justice. See id. at
616-28. Justice Brennan, also writing for four Justices, found that the service in Burnhamwas
sufficient because the defendant had established enough affiliating contacts with the state
during the three days of his visit in California. Id. at 638-40 (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment). Thus, Burnham does not conclusively establish that tag service will be sufficient
grounds for an assertion of transient jurisdiction in all cases. Nor is it clear the extent to which
transient jurisdiction may be asserted over corporate defendants. See, e.g., Wenche Siemer v.
Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that transient jurisdiction
cannot be asserted against a corporation based on service on an agent for service of process).
But see, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610 n.1 (implying that the assertion of jurisdiction in
Perkins was permissible where the president of the corporate defendant was personally served
in the forum state).
140. There are some other circumstances in which Rule 4(k)(2) might be used to establish
jurisdiction. For example, even where tag service does satisfy the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment, if the only state in which a nonresident alien defendant could be
personally served does not have a statute allowing for the assertion of transient jurisdiction,
the defendant could be served pursuant to the federal methods of Rule 4, and transient
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D. Early Concerns with the Validity of Rule 4(k)(2)

The fall-back provision of Rule 4(k)(2) applies to only a small group of federal
question cases. Nonetheless, by virtue of Rule 4's new nationwide service provisions
and Rule 4(k)(2), federal courts now will be able to hale into court defendants in
federal actions who could not have been reached before. Even before the Advisory
Committee first published proposed amendments to the Rule, the question had been
raised whether a rule purporting to govern amenability tojurisdiction would run afoul
of the REA's proscription against rules affecting substantive rights. 4' Professor
Carrington, who was the Reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules from
1985 to 1992, and the principal drafter of the amended Rule 4, alluded to the true
nature of the problem with the amended rule in a 1988 article. In that article Professor
Carrington published an initial draft of the proposed amendment, which would have
provided a federal amenability standard for all federal question claims in federal
court:
It will doubtless occur to some minds to question whether a change in the rule
resulting in nationwide service of process in federal question cases is a change
properly made by rulemaking. Several thoughtful scholars have raised the
question of authority under the Rules Enabling Act. The Supreme Court upheld
Rule 4 against an early challenge of this kind [in MississippiPublishingCorp. v.
Murphree12], and has recently intimated that such a revision is within the

rulemaking power [in Omni CapitalInternationalLtd. v. Rudolf Wolff& Co.'43].
Insofaras the change affects only the mode ofservice, it would seem that the issue
ofrulemakingpowerhas been resolved, but the questionmay remain open insofar
as the issue is the effect ofa revisedrule on the amenabilityofa defendant to the
territorialjurisdiction of a distantfederalforum. It is imaginable that a rule
amendment would be held validto alterthe mode of service of the summons and
complaint, but not effective to alterthe principlesgoverningthe amenability of

jurisdiction could be asserted under Rule 4(k)(2). See David D. Siegel, The New (Dec.1, 1993)
Rule 4 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure: Changes in Summons Service and Personal

Jurisdiction, 152 F.R.D 249, 253-55 (1994) (Part II in Two-Part Series). In some
circumstances, Rule 4(k)(2) also could be used to establish personal jurisdiction over a United
States citizen. See id at 255. For example, assume that the defendant, a citizen of state X, is
temporarily living in Canada, and it is there that he performed the acts that give rise to the
federal action against him. Under stateX's long-arm statute, there is no basis for the assertion
of jurisdiction over the defendant as state X does not assert jurisdiction on the basis of
domicile, or on the basis of acts that occurred outside of the state, and there is no other state
whose long-arm statute would reach the defendant. The defendant may be served in Canada
under Rule 4(f), which provides for service in a foreign country, and jurisdiction can be
asserted under Rule 4(k)(2), on the basis of his United States citizenship, which should create
sufficient affiliating contacts to satisfy the requirements ofthe Fifth Amendment. Cf Blackmer
v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438-39 (1932) (holding that the United States had personal
jurisdiction over an absent citizen).
141. See, e.g., CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PRocEDuRE: CiviL 2D § 1063, at 225 (2d ed. 1987) ("[I]t is doubtful whether the language of
the Rules Enabling Act delegates sufficient authority to the Supreme Court to draft a federal
rule touching upon... [jurisdiction over the person].").
142. 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
143. 484 U.S. 97 (1987).
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a defendant to the territorialjurisdictionof thefederal court.'"
Given the concerns as to the validity under the REA of a Rule governing amenability
to jurisdiction, as well as concerns as to the wisdom of such a rule, Professor

Carrington suggested that the provision for amenability tojurisdiction in federal cases
be enacted by Congress.'45

When the Advisory Committee issued the proposed amendments for public
comment, the proposed federal nationwide amenability standard provided that,
subject to the Constitution or federal statute, service in the United States was

sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in federal cases. 4 6 In a special note, the
Committee recommended that if the federal amenability standard provided in the
proposed amended rule were approved, then it should be given express congressional
approval by statute. 47 At least one commentator objected that the proposed
amenability standard violated the REA.' 48 In response to criticism of other proposed
provisions regarding waiver of service, the Court sent the entire rule back to the
Committee for further study. 14 9 When the proposed amendments wound their way

144. Paul D. Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 733, 744 (1988) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
145. See id.at 744. Professor Carrington's recommendation was that Congress enactthe first
sentence of the draft proposed Rule 4(k), governing only federal questions, the substance of
which ultimately was incorporated into Rule 4(k)(2). See id.As discussed below, however, the
most problematic provision is Rule 4(k)(1), as it purports to impose in federal question cases
a standard of amenability not imposed by any federal statute or in the Constitution.
146. See PreliminaryDraft ofthe ProposedAmendmentsto the FederalRules ofAppellate
Procedureand the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 127 F.R.D. 237, 266 (1989).
147. See id.
148. See Burbank, supranote 27, at 1484 n.164.
149. The new "waiver of service" provision in Rule 4(d) replaced the "service by mail"
provision of the former Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), enacted by Congress in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462,96 Stat. 2527 (1983). See H.R. Doc.
No. 103-74, at 157-63 (1993). Under the supersession clause of the Rules Enabling Act, the
Court-promulgated amendments to the rules rendered the 1983 provisions "ofno further force
of effect," and effectively repealed them. 28 U.S.C. §2072 (b) (1994); see Kelleher, supranote
31. An early version of the waiver of service provision, which was first published for
comments in 1989, and submitted to the Supreme Court in November 1990, drew fire from
foreign governments, as well as certain American governmental agencies and international
lawyers. See Born & Vollmer, supranote 101, at 231-32; Burbank, supra note 27, at 1484 &
n. 163. One objection raised was that allowing the provision to be used for service abroad
would violate the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, openedfor signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T.
361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163. See Burbank, supra note 27, at 1484-90 (discussing international
concerns over the proposed waiver of service provisions, and arguing also that the proposed
provisions were substantive, and would have violated the Rules Enabling Act). The Supreme
Court sent the proposed amendments back to the Committee for further study, and the
Committee made some minor changes to the text to meet the expressed concerns. In the
Committee's view, the revised procedure does not violate the Convention or infringe on the
sovereignty of other nations, as no summons is sent with the request for waiver, and thus it is
not actually service of process. See Born & Vollmer, supra note 101, at 233. But see Burbank,
supranote 27, at 1485 (concluding that the Committee's arguments are not persuasive, and that
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back up to Congress, they had been rewritten, and the revised proposed Rule 4(k)(2)
extended nationwide jurisdiction only to federal questions in cases in which the
defendants were not amenable to the jurisdiction of a state court. This revision did
not, however, solve the problem, as the proposed rule still purported to govern
amenability.'
But the recommendation that the provision be enacted by Congress
had disappeared and, in its stead, the Committee Notes simply mentioned the concern
that Rule 4(k) might be beyond the Court's rulemaking authority, leaving the issue
to the Court and Congress to decide:
SPECIAL NOTE: Mindful of the constraints of the Rules Enabling Act, the
Committee calls the attention of the Supreme Court and Congress to the new
subdivision (k)(2). Should this limited extension of service be disapproved, the
Committee nevertheless recommend adoption of the balance of the rule, with
subdivision (k)(1) becoming simply subdivision (k) ....
"
The Supreme Court transmitted the proposed amendments to Congress without any
changes," 2 and Rule 4(k) became effective seven months later.'53
The few commentators who have considered the validity of the amended Rule 4
under the REA all have focused on Rule 4(k)(2), and most have concluded that it is
valid,5 4 relying heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in MississippiPublishing

"the waiver of service mechanism is in fact a mechanism for defeasible service"). Furthermore,
the cost-shifting provision is not available against a defendant outside the United States, or
availableto aplaintiffoutside the United States. See Born & Vollmer, supra note 101, at233.
But cf Carrington and Apanovitch, supra note 1, at 486-87 (arguing that one purpose of the
waiver provision was to avoid unnecessary costs of translating complaints to be served on
foreign multi-national corporations doing business in the U.S., and that the exemption of
foreign defendants from the fee-shifting provision creates an "unjust asymmetry" that is but
"one of the xenophilial provisions of our law that may explain the extraordinary success of
foreign litigants in American courts").
Objections also had been made to proposed amendments to Rule 4 concerning service
abroad, on the ground that the proposed rule would permit violation of international law and
infringement on the sovereignty of foreign nations. See, e.g., Burbank, supranote 27, at 1485
&n. 173, 1489. The offending provision was eliminated. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4(1); see also H.R.
Doc. No. 103-74, 167-71 (1993).
150. See Burbank, supra note 27, at 1484 n.164.
151. H.R. Doc. No. 103-74, at 154-55 (1993). According to Professor Carrington, this
manner of bringing the issue to Congress's attention was advised by the congressional staffer
consulted on the issue. See Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 1, at 486.
152. See H.R. Doc. No. 103-74, at 154-55 (1993) (reporting "communication from the Chief
Justice of the United States transmitting amendments to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4").
153. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1994) provides that the Supreme Court is to transmit to Congress
by May Iany amendments to the rules that is to become effective that year. Unless Congress
provides otherwise by law, the rule will become effective December 1 of that year. See id.
154. See, e.g., Erichson, supranote 70, at 1147 & n. 197 (citing Mississippi Publ'g Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946), among other authorities, for the proposition that personal
jurisdiction is not a "substantive right' within the meaning of the REA); Sinclair, supra note
72, at 190.
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Corp.v. Murphree. ' For example, Professor Siegel, echoing language in Murphree,
argues:
[w]hile the rights affected by subdivision (k)(2) of Rule 4 are obviously
substantial, they are not "substantive" in the sense used in the... [Rules Enabling
Act] ....
. ..[S]ubdivision (k)(2)... is not designed to change in any particular the
substantive law to be applied in the action against the defendant, but only to add
the federal courts to the list of forums that can hear the action."5 6
The main problem with this analysis is that it treats Rule 4(k) as though it merely
extends the reach of federal courts by expanding the territorial reach of service of
process, just as the former Rule 4(f) had done. But Rule 4(k), unlike the former Rule
4(f), does not govern only service of process. The amended Rule 4(k) is invalid, not
because it expands the reach of service in federal courts, but because it explicitly
purports to govern amenability to jurisdiction, and thus affects a substantive right
contrary to the Rules Enabling Act. Indeed, the most problematic provision is Rule
4(k)(1), because it limits-rather than extends-the jurisdictional reach of federal
courts in federal question cases in a manner not provided for by federal statute or by
the Fifth Amendment. Under Rule 4(k)(1), amenability to jurisdiction in cases
involving claims under federal law is limited by the state-contacts requirement ofthe
Fourteenth Amendment. While that result had been reached by many courts prior to
the amendments to Rule 4, it was wrong. Rule 4, promulgated under the REA, did not
purport to govern amenability, but was concerned only with the reach ofservice. Nor
could a procedural rule govern amenability, as it is a substantive matter beyond the
scope of the Court's rulemaking authority under the REA. The Fifth Amendment
operates directly on federal courts and, in the absence of congressional provision, is
the only limiting standard to which the courts can turn in determining amenability to
jurisdiction. The better view, therefore, is that only the Fifth Amendment nationwidecontacts limitation applies in actions under federal law." 7 As Rule 4(k)(1) purports
to alter the standard for amenability, which is a substantive matter, it violates the
Rules Enabling Act and is invalid.
Professors Teply and Whitten also have argued that Rule 4(k) (specifically Rule
4(k)(2)) is invalid, although not because of the constraints of the REA.' In their
view, personal jurisdiction is not a substantive right, but is procedural within the
meaning ofthe REA. However, they contend, because Congress has regulated federal
long-arm jurisdiction to a large degree, the establishment of "nationwide or
international long-arm jurisdiction independent of the states has, therefore, not
traditionally been considered a matter fit for.., court rulemaking."' Although a

155. 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
156. Siegel, supra note 140, at 253.
157. See supratext accompanying notes 118-19.
158. See TEPLY & WHrrnEN, supranote 83, at 458-60.
159. Id at 459. Professors Teply and Whitten state that "[t]he detail with which Congress
has regulated federal long-arm jurisdiction parallels the degree with which it has regulated
federal venue," and the matter "has, therefore, not traditionally been considered a matter fit for
general superintendence of the judiciary through court rule-making." Id. Professor Whitten
originally developed this argument at greater length in a 1988 article, before Rule 4(k) was
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provision extending jurisdiction nationwide is procedural within the meaning of the
REA, they argue, because Congress has occupied the field, the area is reserved for
Congress exclusively, and such a rule promulgated by the Court would violate
separation of powers principles. 60
While an analysis of the extent to which Congress has regulated a matter is
important, that analysis first should be made in the context of determining the scope
of authority Congress intends to allocate to the Court in the REA, as the issue of
validity under the REA should be considered before consideration of the
constitutional validity of a rule. If possible, the allocation of authority to the Court
under that Act should be read in a sufficiently narrow manner to avoid constitutional
infirmity, and so the constitutional issue need not even be reached."
The validity of Rule 4(k) is analyzed below, in Part IV, using the factors analysis

developed in an earlier, related article.

As already noted, the most significant

factors to be considered with respect to Rule 4(k) are the degree of

congressional-and constitutional-regulation of amenability to jurisdiction, and the
extent to which the rule implicates policies extrinsic to the business of the courts.
IV. AMENABILITY TO JURISDICTION AS A
"SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT" UNDER THE RULES ENABLING ACT

A. The Extent of Congressionaland
ConstitutionalRegulation
As a general rule, detailed, long-standing congressional legislation on a matter is
a strong indication that Congress considers the matter outside the scope of authority
allocated to the Court in the REA." Nationwide service provisions often have been
interpreted as also providing for nationwide amenability tojurisdiction.' 64 Congress,
however, rarely has explicitly legislated jurisdictional standards for cases arising

promulgated. See Whitten, supranote 53, at 70-115 (analyzing the validity of Rule 4 under the
separation of powers doctrine). In the passage quoted, Professors Teply and Whitten appear
to be conflating the issue of service of process with personal jurisdiction, much as the courts
assume that congressional statutes providing for nationwide service also provide for
nationwide amenability to jurisdiction. While this Article agrees with that conclusion, it is
more accurately as a matter of interstitial federal common law, rather than any true
interpretation of the statute. Congress generally has not regulated amenability to jurisdiction
at all, leaving it to the Court, and the constitutional standards. See supra text accompanying
notes 70-78.
160. See TEPLY & WHITrEN, supranote 83, at 459.

16 1.See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-49 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (stating that constitutional issues should be avoided ifpossible); see also Kelleher,
supranote 1, at 112-13 (noting that considering the REA analysis first, and reading the scope
of authority delegated by that Act in an appropriately narrow manner also averts constitutional
infirmity of the REA's supersession clause).
162. See Kelleher, supra note I, at 108-21.
163. See id.
164. See supratext accompanying note 74.
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under federal law. 6 Rather, Congress has left amenability principles to be developed
by the courts, subject to constitutional limits.
It could be argued that this lack of explicit congressional regulation indicates a
decision by Congress to permit prospective regulation by Court-promulgated rules,
and not just by pronouncements on a case-by-case basis. But there is substantive
federal law governing amenability to federal court jurisdiction--the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Thus, as the legislative history of the 1988
amendments to the REA indicates, amenability to jurisdiction is beyond the scope of
authority that Act grants the Court. The House Committee Report states that
the substantive rights protected by the proposed section 2072 include rights
conferred, or that might be conferred, by rules of substantive law .... Thus, the
bill does not confer power on the Supreme Court to promulgate rules regarding
matters, such as limitations or preclusion, that necessarily and obviously define
or limit rights under the substantive law.'"
It may be argued that, although the right to be protected from an inconvenient forum
is constitutionally protected, it is of a procedural nature, as it is implicated only in the
context of litigation, and is, to a large extent (although perhaps not entirely)
concerned with the "fairness... of the litigation process." '67 Even if amenability to
jurisdiction is considered to implicate only "procedural" due process, it has such a
significant impact in defining substantive rights that it also involves a "substantive
right" within the meaning of the Rules Enabling Act.

165. One of the statutes in which Congress has done so is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, which subjects foreign states to suit in American courts for, inter alia, acts taken
"in connection with a commercial activity" that have "a direct effect in the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994); cf Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 711-12 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that, in diversity cases, the
imposition on federal courts of jurisdictional limits under state law, including Fourteenth
Amendment limitations, is mandated by Congress in the Rules of Decision Act); supra text
accompanying notes 105-11.
166. H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 21 (1985); see also 132 CONG. REc. 1434 (1986) (correcting
technical and typographical errors in H.R. REP. No. 99-422 (1985)). This is the Report on
House Bill 3550, the language of which was, in relevant part, identical to the language of the
REA bill that was ultimately passed in 1988. The Report on the 1988 House Bill (which was
identical to the Senate Bill) incorporated by reference House ReportNo. 99-422. See H.R.REP.
No. 100-889, at 29 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5892, 5989. Professor Burbank
(on whose work much of House Report No. 99-422 is based), as well as then-Professor (now
Judge) Moore conclude that the House Report is the best evidence of congressional intent with
respect to the Act. See Burbank, supranote 50, at 1030-36; Moore, supra note 9, at 1043-49.
The Senate Report, however, provides contradictory evidence of congressional intent, which
could make the House Report seem, at least to those antagonistic to using legislative history,
an attempt by the drafters of the House Report to redefine the terms of the REA in a manner
to which the Senate did not agree.
167. John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth ofErie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693, 725 (1974).
Professor Richman has argued that although personal jurisdiction cannot be fairly characterized
as an issue of "substantive" due process, it also cannot be characterized as "procedural" due
process. See Richman, supra note 97, at 609. He proposes a separate category of
"jurisdictional" due process. See id. at 609-10.
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The legislative history ofthe 1934 Rules Enabling Act indicates that the protection
of substantive rights was intended to extend to "procedural" constitutional interests
(although the liberty interest implicated in personal jurisdiction analysis was not
specifically considered). For example, matters concerning the selection and
qualifications of jurors were specifically referred to as "substantive" within the
meaning of the REA.' 68 And in 1963, Justices Black and Douglas dissented from the
submission of amendments to Rule 50 governing directed verdicts on the ground that,
although it could be characterized as a "procedural" protection, the right to trial by
jury is a substantive matter beyond the scope of the Court's rulemaking authority. 69
Indeed, they went a step farther, and also urged the repeal of Rule 49, concerning
special verdicts, on the ground that it impaired the power of the jury to render a
general verdict,
which was necessary, in the Justices' view, to preserving the right of
170
trial by jury.
A Court-promulgated rule, however, properly can govern the method of service of
process-the mechanics by which the assertion of jurisdiction is made. The
sufficiency of service in federal court-whether it provides the defendant adequate
notice of the action, and an opportunity to be heard in a reasonable time-also is
governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."7 It can be argued that
a choice of the method by which service will be made, such as a choice of requiring
personal service instead of substituted service at a person's home, will affect that
interest. In fact, as Professor Burbank points out, virtually all Federal Rules and
statutes concerning methods for the conduct of litigation implicate some aspect of due
process, and thus, a constitutionally protected interest. For that reason, he urges that
the only constitutionally protected interests relevant under the REA are those that are
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, to ensure "that the entire enterprise does
not founder in the lap of the due process clause."" The right to adequate notice of
the action, for example, is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Thus,
Professor Burbank argues, it should not be considered a "substantive right" within the

168. See S. REP. No. 69-1174, at 9 (1926), discussed in Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules
EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1083-89, 1169 (1982). Professor Burbank
cites also the attention paid in the consideration of the Criminal Rules Enabling Act to the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants which, although procedural in the sense that they
go to the fairness of the trial, were clearly considered substantive rights, and beyond the
purview of rules of court. See id at 1169 & n.664.
169. See Order of January 21, 1963, 374 U.S. 865, 866-68 (Black and Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting).
170. See id. at 867-68; see also Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 1, at 479-80
(criticizing the Court for upholding local rules reducing the size of civil juries, on the ground
that such rules violate the Seventh Amendment and, inferentially, the REA limits on
rulemaking).
171. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950)
(requirement of notice under Fourteenth Amendment); see also, e.g., Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-41 (1932) (requirement of notice under Fifth Amendment).
172. Burbank, supra note 39, at 1171 (footnote omitted). Professor Burbank does not
address the issue of whether amenability to jurisdiction implicates a substantive right, but his
analysis ofthe interest in notice would, presumably, extend to all interests protected by the Due
Process Clause, which he refers to as a constitutional provision of "exquisite generality." Id.
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meaning of the REA, and is subject to regulation by rule."
Provisions governing amenability to jurisdiction, however, can be distinguished
readily from those governing the mechanics and reach of service of process. A
provision establishing the mechanics of service does not purport to govern the
determination of whether notice under that provision is adequate. A rule requiring
personal service is more likely to ensure actual notice than a rule permitting
substituted service, and thus more likely to be constitutionally valid. But such a rule
does not alter the standard by which the adequacy of the notice afforded by the
service made pursuant to the rule will be evaluated. That standard for adequacy of
notice is established by the requirements of the Due Process Clause, and the rule has
not imposed any greater requirement than that set by the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment." A rule purporting to govern personal jurisdiction is a very different
creature. Such a rule does not set out merely the "manner" or "means" of asserting
personal jurisdiction-that is what the service provisions do. Rather, it sets out a test
by which amenability to jurisdiction is adjudged, a matter already governed by the
substantive law of the Constitution. Rule 4(k), by purporting to govern amenability
to service, is invalid, insofar as it imposes a standard different from-that is, more
restrictive than-that provided by the Constitution, or by Congress.
B.The Impact ofthe Rule
on CongressionalPolicy
A related factor is whether a rule will interfere with, or will promote, congressional
"
policy. 75
' A rule that incorporates congressional legislative policy is permissible, as
it has no impact on that policy, but simply articulates that policy. Thus, to the extent
that Rule 4(k) incorporates state law limits on federal court jurisdiction in diversity
cases, including the Fourteenth Amendment state contacts requirement, it is valid, as
76
it merely restates the congressional policy set out in the Rules of Decision Act.'
With respect to federal questions, however, Congress has not expressed a similar
policy decision that the standard of amenability to jurisdiction should be more
restrictive than that provided in the Fifth Amendment, but has left the constitutional
standard in place. Indeed, even in those statutes in which Congress has provided for
nationwide service, it has not articulated explicitly any policy decision with respect
to amenability. Thus, the only relevant congressional policy is the broad policy of the
REA, that Court-promulgated procedural rules must not "abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right."'77 As amenability to jurisdiction is substantive within the
meaning of that Act, it may not be affected by a rule of procedure.

173. Id.
at 1170-71.
174. It is true that a challenge may be made to the sufficiency of the service, and if the
required means is personal delivery, substituted service will not do. But the issue in such a
challenge is only whether the service was properly effected in accordance with the rule's
requirement. The issue is not whether the notice was adequate. The latter issue is determined
by reference to the Due Process Clause, not by reference to the requirements of the rule.
175. See Kelleher, supra note 1, at 113-14.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 104-11.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).
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C. Whether the MatterIs One Traditionally
in the Domain of the States
The presumption under the REA is that Congress did not intend to delegate to the
Court authority to preempt state substantive law by procedural rules.'78 That
presumption is buttressed by the Rules of Decision Act. Thus, as stated above, the
incorporation of state amenability standards is appropriate in cases governed by
substantive state law. In actions arising under federal law, however, there is no such
concern with the displacement of state law, as there is no state law to displace.
Rather, where Congress has not provided a specific amenability standard, in the
absence of congressional regulation, the sole applicable law is the Fifth Amendment,
which provides a national contacts standard. It already has been demonstrated that
standard is substantive, and thus it should not be displaced by a rule of procedure.
D. The Trans-SubstantiveNature of the Rule
One purpose of the REA was to provide uniform, general rules of civil procedure
for federal courts, which Congress contemplated ordinarily would be transsubstantive-that is, that the rules would not vary with the substantive nature of the
action. 79 With respect to amenability standards, however, there are strong policy
reasons, influenced by constitutional principles, for differing standards in federal
question and diversity cases.' If Congress were make no legislative provision, the
nationwide contacts requirement of the Fifth Amendment would apply to cases in
federal courts. In the Rules of Decision Act, Congress provided that state substantive
law, including Fourteenth Amendment amenability standard, applies in diversity
cases. Rule 4(k) would not be problematic if it simply were to incorporate these
constitutional and statutory standards-that is, if the rule simply provided that the
amenability standard in federal question cases is the national contacts test of the Fifth
Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment state contacts standard for diversity
cases. The rule, however, does not stop there. Rather, it distinguishes among actions
under federal law based on whether the defendants would be subject to the personal
jurisdiction of courts of general jurisdiction in any of the states. This distinction

178. See Kelleher, supranote 1, at 114-15. Because ofthe substantive rights limitation under
the REA, operating, in effect, as a rule of construction, the "'Rules should be read with
sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies."' Id. at 115 (quoting Gasperini
v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 n.7 (1996)).
179. See Kelleher, supra note 1, at 115-17; see also Carrington, supra note 52, at 303-04
(arguing that the delegation of authority to promulgate "general" rules of procedure should be
presumed to mean trans-substantive rules, citing the recent merger of law and equity as
support, and the fact that the drafters were aware of the costs of differentiated procedure in
England); Subrin, FederalRules, supra note 6, at 2005-06 (arguing that in the political and
social climate of the time, it would have been difficult to persuade Congress to confer on the
Courtthe powerto promulgate non-trans-substantive procedural rules, because of the potential
for manipulation to favor particular interests). But see Burbank, supra note 50, at 1029-36
(arguing that there is no support in the legislative history for Professor Carrington's contention
as to the meaning of "general").
180. See supratext accompanying notes 115-17.
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among federal question cases based on the nature of the defendants' contacts with the
various states is unjustified, and contrary to the basic requirement of uniformity transsubstantivity. Congress has not expressed an intent to limit the jurisdiction of federal
courts in such cases, and such a policy should not be established by a rule of
procedure.
E. The Implication of PoliciesExtrinsic
to the Business of the Courts
The prospective formulation of a rule governing amenability to jurisdiction
involves policy choices that are "extrinsic to the business of the courts,"'' and more
appropriately left to Congress. Of course, no rule or statute can allow a court to assert
jurisdiction over a defendant in violation of the Constitution, but Congress, through
statute, could limit the ability of the courts to assert personal jurisdiction over
defendants, thus providing protections to defendants beyond those of the Fifth
Amendment. Such additional protection may not be afforded by a Court-promulgated
rule, however. Some of the policy considerations involved in the formulation of such
a rule could be said to be procedural, such as concerns with the fairness and
convenience to the defendant, the plaintiff, and to witnesses, and concerns with the
allocation of court resources and efficiency. Other policy considerations, however,
are more substantive, such as considerations of the duties of the court to render, and
the rights of the parties to receive, judgments. Other substantive considerations
include the impact that assertions of jurisdiction over aliens may have on the
sovereign interests of other nations, and on the federal government's foreign relations
policy. These decisions are appropriately dealt with by legislation passed by both
Houses and presented to the President.'82
F. The Importance of the Matter to the Orderly
Functioningof the Courts
Amenability to jurisdiction is obviously of the utmost importance to the orderly
functioning of the courts, as without jurisdiction the court has no authority to act.
Thus, even in the absence of any prospective rule governing personal jurisdiction, a
court would find it necessary to rule on the issue in order to function efficiently,
which is a characteristic of a procedural matter. However, the limits on a court's
ability to assert jurisdiction are determined by reference to constitutional standards.
Thus, the court need not create its own amenability standard, other than interpreting
the Constitution. As noted above, the constitutional regulation removes the
amenability issue from the scope of procedural matters subject to prospective
regulation by Court-promulgated rule.

181. H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 22 (1985).
182. See Burbank, supranote 27, at 1486; cf Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (noting that the courts should exercise "'[g]reat care and reserve'
"'when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field"') (alteration
added) (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)); Born, supra note 100.
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V. CONCLUSION

While the means and territorial reach of service of process properly may be
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the analysis above shows that
amenability to jurisdiction is a substantive matter beyond the scope of the Court's
authority under the Rules Enabling Act. As amended in 1993, Rule 4(k)(1) provides
that service is effective to establish personaljurisdiction over a defendant "who could3
be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction" in the forum state.1
This provision purports to govern amenability to jurisdiction in both federal question
cases and diversity cases. Amenability to jurisdiction in diversity cases is governed
by the Rules of Decision Act, which mandates that federal courts apply state law in
diversity cases, including Fourteenth Amendment standards. Thus, with respect to
diversity cases, Rule 4(k)(1) is in accord with the governing standard. Insofar as it
purports to govern federal question cases, however, it is invalid. The RDA does not
apply to actions under federal law, and thus the only governing standard is the Fifth
Amendment, which permits aggregation of national contacts. If Rule 4(k)(1) were
applied in federal question cases, it would afford defendants greater protection than
they have under that standard, and would impermissibly affect substantive rights in
violation of the Rules Enabling Act. Rule 4(k)(2), however, is not as problematic,
insofar as it incorporates the appropriate constitutional standard. However, Rule
4(k)(2) is limited in application to a specific class of federal actions, in which the
defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in a state court. Thus, that provision likely is
also invalid, if the limiting language could not be severed, and if the provision were
read as applying only to the specified federal actions, to excluding the application of
Fifth Amendment standards in all others.'" 4
The Committee Notes suggest that if Congress were to have disapproved Rule
4(k)(2), it should have permitted the remainder of the rule to become law.' 5 These
notes could be considered evidence of the Committee's intent to have Rule 4(k)(2)
severed from the remainder of the rule were it adjudged invalid in subsequent
litigation. However, as shown above, the problematic provision is not just Rule
4(k)(2). Rather, Rule 4(k)(1) also is problematic for extending to defendants in most
federal actions greater protections from assertions of jurisdiction than they would
have under federal law or the Constitution. That provision contains the substance of
the bulge rule, which the Committee certainly did not envisage would be
invalidated.'86

183. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
184. Ironically, if Rule 4(k)(2) applied to all federal questions, as originally drafted, see
Carrington, supranote 144, at 754-59, it would be valid, as it would simply be an articulation
of the governing constitutional standard.
185. See supra text accompanying note 147.
186. The jurisdictional provision of Rule 4(k)(1)(B), which includes the substance of the
former bulge rule, is itself problematic. That provision governs cases in diversity, providing
that service effects jurisdiction, applying the Fifth Amendment standard of amenability. As a
matter of policy, the rule is defensible, for it promotes judicial efficiency, by permitting the
federal court to assert jurisdiction over persons who do not have sufficient contacts with the
forum state, but who are important to the case. While Congress has constitutional authority to
provide the standard for amenability to jurisdiction, as it has done for diversity cases in the
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The only real solution is the one proposed at the outset. When the amendments to
the rule originally were drafted, Professor Carrington, then the Reporter for the
Advisory Committee, recommended that Congress enact legislation providing for a
national amenability standard.1 7 It is unfortunate that this recommendation did not
make its way to Congress. The rulemakers should remedy that error, by
recommending the repeal of Rule 4(k) in its entirety, by redrafting the rule to govern
only service of process, and by recommending to Congress that it enact a uniform
federal amenability provision for all actions arising under federal law. If Congress
does not do so, courts will be left to determine amenability issues as a matter of
interstitial federal common law, in a way that "implements the federal Constitution
and statutes, and is conditioned by them,"' 88 much as courts often are required to
determine limitations periods.'89 Such an approach might be "unsettling,'"" as
Professor Carrington suggests, but it is even more unsettling to have the Court and
the rulemakers ignore the limits of the delegation in the Rules Enabling Act.

general provision of the Rules Decision Act, such a rule is beyond the scope of Court
rulemaking authority in the REA.
187. See supratext accompanying notes 142-44.
188. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,472 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
189. See supratext accompanying note 76.
190. Carrington, supra note 144, at 744.

